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The purpose of this study is to test the group level effect of unit leader support on 
the relationship between the level of stressors in combat and the level of post-combat 
aggression and violence. One focus is whether unit leadership has a direct effect on the 
level of post-combat aggression and violence. Another focus is whether unit leadership 
interacts with unit combat experience and buffers the relationship between unit combat 
exposure and the level of unit post-combat aggression and violence. This study utilizes 
data from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Land Combat Study. The Land 
Combat Study was designed to examine the impact of combat experiences on the mental 
health and functioning of soldiers and their families.  The sample consisted of active duty 
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soldiers who participated in combat as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 
2004. Data were aggregated to the unit level. Multiple regression analysis was employed 
to address the effects of unit combat exposure, unit perception of danger, and unit leader 
support on the level of unit post-combat aggression and violence.    
 Results indicate that combat experience, a combination of both unit level 
perception of danger and unit combat exposure significantly predict a unit’s post-combat 
aggression and violence. The study also found the level of unit leader support buffered 
the level of unit combat experience and resulted in decreased levels of post-combat 
aggression and violence such that as unit combat exposure increased, increased levels of 
unit leadership decreased levels of post-combat aggression and violence. Finally, this 
study also found that the level of unit leader support did no t significantly provide a main 
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Introduction 
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, over half (234,173) of the soldiers in the US Army have 
experienced combat in Afghanistan, Iraq or both (JTPR Data Base, 2004). Combat in Iraq 
has been noted as the most intense fighting the US Army has participated in since the 
Viet Nam War (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting & Koffman, 2004). Combat is 
known to have numerous direct deleterious effects on its participants (Glenn, Beckham, 
Feldman, Kirby, Hertzberg & Moore, 2002; Nock, Kaufman & Rosenheck, 2001; 
Beckham, Feldman & Kirby, 1998; Hobfoll, Spielberger, Breznitz, Figley, Folkman, 
Lepper-Green, Meichenbaum, Milgram, Sandler, Sarason & van der Kolk, 1991; 
Prigerson, Maciejewski & Rosenheck, 2002). In the combat environment, soldiers use 
extreme violence to accomplish organizationally directed objectives. Soldiers are also the 
target of extreme violence and in response or proactively use extreme violence for self 
preservation. In each of these examples, soldiers are sanctioned to appropriately use 
violence as a tool to control the environment.  However, when soldiers return from the 
combat environment, their use of violence is no longer appropriate.  
One of the primary factors in predicting aggression and violence in interpersonal 
relationships is the prior use of violence and aggression (Nock, Kaufman & Rosenheck, 
2001). Because violence is an unavoidable factor of soldiering in combat, it is 
particularly important to investigate whether and how other factors, such as combat 
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stressors, and unit (group) characteristics affect soldiers’ levels of post combat violence. 
This research has promise in a number of important areas. First, it may increase the 
ability to predict which soldiers will be aggressive and use violence after returning from 
the war zone. Second, and potentially most importantly, it may inform the Army about 
unit characteristics which best decrease soldiers’ post combat violence. If we find that 
specific organizational factors decrease soldiers’ use of aggression and violence after 
returning from combat, implications for organizational change may emerge. There are 
numerous examples of the Army changing procedures to better transition soldiers to post 
deployment environment. Some examples of changes are: mandated reunion briefings, 
redeployment half day leave schedule, and mandated mental health screening prior to 
redeployment and 3 months after returning home.  
 
Background 
During the months of June and July 2002 there were four homicides of active duty 
soldiers’ spouses at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The four cases generated significant 
national and international news coverage. There were numerous media reported 
hypotheses about why the homicides had happened. Three of the four soldiers had just 
returned from duty in Afghanistan and were in the same Command, 7th Special Forces. 
As awareness of the tragedy increased, the US Army Office of the Surgeon General 
(OTSG) established a charter for an epidemiological consultation (EPICON) team to visit 
Fort Bragg and consult with local medical and line leadership. The team’s objectives 
were to assess and provide recommendations to OTSG to address potential systemic and 
cultural factors that might have contributed to the homicides. One of the EPICON’s 
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(OTSG, 2002) major recommendations was to further study of the impact of combat on 
domestic violence, health outcomes and health risk behaviors. At approximately the same 
time, the Chief of Staff for the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg requested that Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) commission a study to evaluate soldier 
wellness. The WRAIR constructed a survey that sought soldiers’ responses on numerous 
questions pertaining to: combat experiences, work environment, morale, cohesion, 
communication, leadership, combat readiness, physical health status, mental health status, 
aggressive behaviors, alcohol/drug use, marital satisfaction, domestic violence, marital 
concerns, well-being and adjustment of children and retention intentions. This robust 
survey, called the Land Combat Study (LCS), was approved and access to soldiers of the 
18th Airborne Corps was granted.  
Units from the 18th Airborne Corps spearheaded the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq in 2003. Units from the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart Georgia, the 101st 
Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell Kentucky and the 82nd Airborne 
Division at Fort Bragg North Carolina completed the LCS three months after returning. 
For the first time in US Army history, and potentially military history, a large sample of 
combat soldiers from various units completed a survey on a wide array of stressor and 
strain variables. Additionally, the soldiers were surveyed anonymously and a relatively 
short time after their participation in intense combat. Possibly for the first time, the 






Organization of the Dissertation 
 The purpose of this study is to test the effect of organizational characteristic s on 
the relationship between stressors in combat and post-combat aggression and violence. A 
comprehensive review of the conceptual and empirical literature on the relationship 
between combat stressors and post combat aggression and violence, along with factors 
that moderate this relationship, will be investigated. Given that this phenomenon 
encompasses both individual development and a soldier’s occupational stress factors, 
literature from both civlian and military occupational stress fields will be reviewed. From 
the review, a conceptual model will be proposed along with testable hypotheses. The 
methodology section will build on the conceptual model by first describing and then 
proposing the use of a multiple regression analysis strategy. The data will be analyzed 
and then findings will be discussed.    
 Large numbers of US Army soldiers have participated in combat in Iraq. In past 
wars, combat has been found to have numerous negative consequences for soldiers. The 
most obvious are death and physical injury. The experience of combat also results in 
some soldiers experiencing mental health difficulties. Also noted in the literature is the 
phenomenon of soldiers returning from combat with higher rates of aggression and 
violence. Decreasing soldiers’ post-combat difficulties is an important goal for active 
duty social work officers. Specifically, decreasing soldiers’ post-combat aggression and 
violence supports combat soldiers’ often difficult transition to non-combat duty. There 
are no studies that have investigated the role of combat stressors and organizational 
support on the amount of aggression and violence that combat soldiers report post-
combat. Increasing knowledge in the area of post-combat aggression and violence is an 
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important undertaking that may potentially guide further research in this timely and 
vitally important issue. This increased knowledge could support and guide organizational 
interventions which focus on decreasing combat soldiers post-combat aggression and 
violence. 
 
Relevance to Social Work 
The organizational behavior and industrial-organizational psychology fields have 
developed and tested individual and organiza tional models that examine the relationship 
between occupational stressors and physical, psychological and behavioral strains (see 
Cooper et al., 2001; Crandall & Perrew, 1995). Googins and Godfrey (1985) define 
occupational social work as “a field of practice in which social workers attend to the 
human and social needs of the work community by designing and executing appropriate 
interventions to insure healthier individuals and environment” (p. 38). Writing in the 
1920s, the social worker Mary Follet was a vanguard in using social sciences to solve 
business problems (Fox & Urwick, 1982). Follet recognized that organizations were open 
and dynamic systems where labor and management worked together to achieve business 
objectives (Sorge & Warner, 1997). Even though some of the earliest organizational 
psychological writings focus ing on occupational stress were written by social workers, 
few contemporary social workers publish on the subject (Barak & Bargal, 2000). Barak 
and Bargal (2000, p.4) suggest that occupational social workers focus their interventions 
at four objectives: 
1. Improve the fit between the needs of individuals and their families, 
work organizations and communities.  




3. Introduce into the workplace social work values and principles such as 
valuing diversity and balancing family needs with work demands. 
4. Generate knowledge in the area of social work that will inform practice 
and policy. 
 
Pearline and Schooler (1984) suggest that work problems are intertwined with the 
social structure and organization of the workplace and thus require collective rather than 
individual responses. Balgopal (1989) concurs and suggests occupational social workers 
assess the environmental stressors, “An occupational social worker would include 
locating various stressors that are intrinsic to the work environment and persist 
independently of the client (p. 441). Donovan (1987) discusses the importance of 
incorporating environmental assessments into clinical practice and states:  
…social work’s professional code of ethics mandates a broader concern, that is, 
concern about the “troubling working conditions” as well as “the troubled worker.” 
They advocate a preventative approach to service development, incorporating the 
work environment into assessments and interventions and expanding knowledge of 
the impact of poor working conditions on individual and family well being (p. 259).  
   
 Kurzman and Akabas (1981, p. 54) similarly state “Social work’s survival and 
effectiveness in industrial settings, therefore, will be due in part to the nature and extent 
of professional expertise but also to an understanding of the special qualities of the 
setting.” Balgopal (1989) articulates this point even further, “Practitioners will need to 
understand differences in organizational climate and character to make that particular 
environment responsive to intervention efforts and to share their results with other social 
workers” (p. 440).    
 Colonel David Lockett, the Social Work Consultant to the Army Surgeon General 
wrote in his overview of Army social work (1999), “Unlike social work practice in many 
other areas, military social work exists with the bottom line function of supporting the 
readiness of soldiers to fight and win wars for our nation” (p. 315). At face value, 
 
 7 
supporting violence may appear to contradict social work ethics, but a deeper analysis 
reveals that Army social workers provide support to soldiers who perform the 
organization’s objectives. Uniformed social workers have been commissioned in the 
Army since the 1950s, providing clinical services and case management for soldiers and 
their family members (Harris, 1999).  
Currently, social work officers serve in the combat operational Army in one of three 
units: (1) Combat Divisions, (2) Medical Detachments (Combat Stress), and (3) Medical 
Brigades. In these positions, the social workers provide individual and group mental 
health services, preventive psycho-educational courses and consultation to leaders on the 
management and prevention of combat stress reactions. Social workers assigned to 
operational units are the front line behavioral health providers and consultants to soldiers 
and commanders during combat operations. They must know how combat stressors affect 
units and individual soldiers. Martin and Campbell (1999) addressed the unique position 
of the uniformed social worker as follows:  
“You must have the capacity of grasping the reality of the physical mental and 
emotional stressors of combat and the impact of the leadership challenges faced by 
combat arms officers, NCOs and soldiers. You must be willing to face the hardships 
and be able to provide a stabilizing and calming force (p. 160). 
 
Further, and possibly more importantly, social workers must know how to mitigate 
combat stressors through direct services or consultation to unit commanders. Ideally, this 
reduces soldiers’ strain during combat and once they return home. When knowledge of 
the military system is combined with strong professional credib ility, mastery of 
appropriate theory, political interactional skill and empirical evidence, the experienced 
military social worker may be able to effect change at the institutional level.  
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This study has the potential to increase the general social work knowledge base on 
combat stressors and soldier’s strains upon returning from combat. Specific to the Army, 
the findings may support specific organizational changes and policy recommendations to 
enhance the functioning of soldiers and their families.  In summary, there exists a 
historical precedent for social work involvement in the occupational setting of both 
private and military sectors. To be credible, this knowledge must be empirically based 























 The purpose of this study is to test the effects of organizational characteristics on 
the relationship between combat stressors and post-combat aggression and violence. 
Therefore, this review appraises literature from three major areas: (1) literature that 
reviews stressor strain models; (2) literature that reviews the effects of combat on soldiers 
and their post-combat aggression and violence strain; and (3) occupational stress 
literature that tests how organizations buffer individua ls from stressors. This review also 
highlights literature that focuses on combat or occupational violence as a stressor and 
aggression/violence as a strain. In an effort to better understand how these factors affect 
soldiers, studies that have used active duty military populations have also been reviewed.    
 
The Stress-Strain Process 
 The literature contains varying definitions, conceptualizations and 
operationalizations for the concept of stress (Brief & George, 1991; Cooper, Dewe & 
Driscoll, 2001; Lazarus, 1995). Researchers have conceptualized stress in one of three 
ways: as a response to stimulus, as a stimulus, and as the result of a transaction between 
environmental and individual variables. The general definition used for this study is 
based on the transactional theory of stress. Stress occurs when there is an imbalance 
between the person and the environment (Cooper et al., 2001). To facilitate 
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understanding of the transactional stress theory, a brief review of the development of 
stress models is presented.   
 
Stress as Response Model 
 The earliest conceptualization of stress, as a response, developed out of Cannon’s 
(1935) work in examining the central nervous system and the adrenal system in response 
to fear or pain. He posited that emergencies like fear and pain stimulate the central 
nervous system to instigate hormonal discharge of the adrenalin glands which results in 
cardiovascular changes to prepare the body for “fight or flight” (Cannon, 1935). Hans 
Selye (1956) performed laboratory research focused on understanding the effects of 
harmful substances on animals. He defined stress as “a non-specific response of the body 
to any demand placed upon it” (p.1). Based on his work of categorizing responses to 
“stressors” (p. 51), Seyle posited that when individuals experience a stressful stimulus, 
they will respond with a predictable set of reactions, which he termed “general adaptation 
syndrome” (GAS). Seyle conceptualized GAS as a three phase process: alarm reaction, 
adaptation response, and exhaustion. Underlying his theory, Seyle assumed that stress 
response was universal and stimuli were undifferentiated.  
The “stress as response” concept has been widely challenged. Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984) argue that response-based definitions do not provide a theoretical 
foundation to identify potential stressors. They state, “We then have no systematic way of 
identifying prospectively what will be a stressor and what will not” (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984, p. 14). Edwards (1992) criticized the theory for ignoring the individual and 
environmental psychological variables of appraisal and coping. Cooper and colleagues 
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(2001) argued that the stress as response theory ignored important environmental factors, 
such as intensity, frequency and duration of the stimulus. Seyle’s concepts of stress as 
response and GAS have significantly influenced the conceptualization of stress. 
However, by failing to differentiate different types of stressors and ignoring the impact of 
psychological responses, Seyle limited his theory’s utility in describing the whole of the 
stress process (Cox, 1987). 
 
Stress as a Stimulus Model 
These theoretical shortcomings led to a shift in stress research. Researchers began 
to focus on external conditions influencing stress. As early as 1953, Grinker stated that 
“the human organism is part of and in equilibrium with it’s environment, that it’s 
psychological processes assist in maintaining an internal equilibrium and that the 
psychological functioning of the organism is sensitive to both internal and external 
conditions” (p. 152). Stimulus-based conceptualizations and definitions of stress sought 
to identify internal and external sources that disturbed the individual’s equilibrium. This 
approach has been criticized for ignoring individual differences, being too stressor 
focused, too one-dimensional, and too reductionist (Cooper et al., 2001; Lazarus, 1995, 
Perrewe & Zellars, 1999). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) point out the shortcomings by 
asserting that, “there is no objective way to predict psychological stress without reference 
to properties of the person” (p.21). Although the “stress as response” and the “stress as 
stimulus” models identify important components of the stress strain process, neither is 
comprehensive in their description of the whole process. They both ignore the perceptual 
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and cognitive processes of stress appraisal and individual differences in appraisal and 
stress responses (Cooper et al., 2001; Lewis, 2003). 
 
Transactional Stress Model 
 To formulate a comprehensive theory and definition of stress, Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984) developed the transactional theory of stress to address the identified 
shortcomings of both the stress as response and stress as stimulus models. The 
transactional stress model hypothesizes that stress is the result of a perceived disparity 
between the demands of an individual’s environment and the way individuals respond 
(Aldwin, 1994; Cohen, Evans, Stokols & Krantz, 1986; Evans & Cohen, 1987; Lazarus, 
1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) specifically defined stress as “a relationship between the person and the 
environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources 
and endangering his or her well-being” (p. 21). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) further 
proposed two cognitive mechanisms which moderate the individual’s stressor strain 
relationship: cognitive appraisal and coping.       
 
Cognitive Appraisal  
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) describe cognitive appraisal as the evaluative 
process that intervenes between the event and the reaction. The process of cognitive 
appraisal has both primary and secondary components. Primary appraisal is the judgment 
that an encounter (with the environment) is either irrelevant, benign-positive or stressful 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p53). Irrelevant encounters are those which the individual 
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deems as having no personal meaning for the individual. Benign-positive encounters are 
those appraised as beneficial or desirable. Stressful encounters are those that are 
considered as either a threat, challenge, harmful or indicative of actual or perceived loss 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Secondary appraisal is the cognitive process of identifying 
what can be done to minimize the threat of loss or harm (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Secondary appraisal requires individuals to evaluate their own abilities and resources as 
well as environmental resources available to counter the stressful situation. It also 
includes identifying the potential consequences of a strategy or course of action (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984). In summary of the appraisal process, an individual perceives a 
stressor and determines the importance or meaning of the event. Then the individual 
identifies and evaluates possible actions, available resources and potential consequences 
to counter the stressful situation. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) describe the culmination 
of these cognitions and behaviors as coping. 
 
Coping 
  Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define coping as “cognitive and behavioral efforts 
made to master, reduce or tolerate the internal or external demands that are created by the 
stressful transaction” (p. 43). The authors posit two primary forms of coping: problem-
focused coping and emotional- focused coping. Problem-focused coping entails strategies 
aimed at acting upon the stressful environment to reduce its negative impact. Emotional-
focused coping involves behaviors which alleviate the emotional consequences of the 
stressful environment but do not change the actual environment (Cooper et al., 2001). 
Coping is a continuous and dynamic process where individuals re-evaluate the efficacy of 
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their strategies. They determine whether their desired results have been achieved; if not, 
negative feedback initiates further coping, evaluation, and adjustment. Problem-focused 
and emotional- focused coping can be executed separately or jointly and are only 
constrained by the individual’s personal and environmental resources (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). 
 Transactional stress theory provides a broad conceptual framework to better 
understand and examine the effects of combat. Specific to this study, the theory helps to 
explain the relationship between cognitive appraisal of combat, moderating 
organizational factors which support coping strategies and the physiological, 




The stress research literature has identified a number of negative consequences of 
work-related stress at both the individual level and the organizational level (Cooper et al., 
2001; Jackson & Schuler, 1985; Sullivan & Bhagat, 1992). These negative consequences 
denote the “strain” in the stressor-strain process. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) indicate 
that strain occurs when individuals appraise the demands of the stressor in excess of the ir 
ability to cope. Strain is manifested in three primary areas: physiological, psychological 
and behavioral (Kahn & Byosiere, 1992).   
 Physiological strain is associated with physiological problems that have been 
empirically linked to occupational stress. Studies have linked occupational stress to 
cardiovascular symptoms (Karasek & Theorell, 1990; Schnall, Landsbergis & Baker, 
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1994), endocrine and immune system dysfunction (Uchino, Cacioppo & Kiecolt-Glasser, 
1996), gastrointestinal symptoms (Fried, Rowland, & Ferris, 1984; Schulz, Greenley & 
Brown, 1995) and infectious disease (Schaubroeck, Jones & Xie, 2001).  
 In the occupational stress literature, psychological strain has been extensively 
researched. Job satisfaction has been the most widely examined form of psychological 
strain (Lewis, 2003), but evidence suggests that occupationally derived stress is also 
associated with diminished self esteem, anxiety, depression, boredom and organizational 
commitment (Sullivan & Bhagat, 1992). Military stress research has also identified a 
number of psychological strains as a result of combat: posttraumatic stress disorder, 
combat stress reactions, and hostility (Glenn et al., 2002; Nock et al., 2001; Beckham et 
al., 1998; Hobfoll et al., 1991; Prigerson et al., 2002) 
 Behavioral strains that have been linked to occupational stress are absenteeism, 
taken sick days and turnover (Cooper & Bramwell, 1992; Gupta & Beehr, 1979; Jamal, 
1984), and job tension and commitment (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Sullivan & Bhagat, 1992). 
Studies specific to the stressor of combat have found behavioral strains in the form of 
aggression and interpersonal violence (Prigerson, Maciejewski & Rosenheck, 2002; 
Glenn, Beckham, Feldman, Kirby, Hertzberg, & Moore, 2002; Nock, Kaufman, & 
Rosenheck, 2001; Beckham, Feldman, & Kirby, 1998). How this study differs from the 
above studies will be described in detail. 
 
Soldier Adaptation Model  
 Bliese and Castro (2003) attempt to extend the transactional stress model and 
further refine it to specifically model military occupational stress. They propose the 
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Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM) as a meta-theory, a framework for hypothesis 
generation. The SAM is comprised of three major components: stressors, moderators 
(both individual and unit/organizational) and strains.  
 As implied in the title, the SAM is specific to military occupational stress. 
Stressors are aspects of the environment that place a load or demand on the soldier (Jex, 
Behr, & Roberts, 1992). The SAM assumes that measurable stressors exist in all sold ier 
environments: training, garrison, peacekeeping and combat. Being able to distinguish 
specific stressors in each of these environments allows the comparison of the effects of 
stressors across environments. For example, soldiers in both peace enforcement 
operations and combat operations may engage in the stressful activity of handling human 
remains. By delineating and measuring the specific stressor “handling human remains” 
findings and recommendations developed in one environment can potentially be applied 
to the same stressor in other environments.  
 The second component of the SAM is moderators. Moderator variables change 
the form of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. They are 
constructs that intensify or buffer the relationship between stressors and strains. Bliese 
and Castro (2003) postulate that there are three levels where moderators impact. Those 
levels are the individual, the local group and the organization (Bliese & Castro, 2003). 
Like their assumption with stressors, moderators at each level must be identifiable and 
measurable. This supports research that measures the impact of moderators at different 
levels. Bliese and Castro (2003) argue that this line of inquiry is perhaps the most 
important in the military occupational stress field. They state:  
            In many situations (including peacekeeping) the stressors are likely to be 
immutable: mission accomplishment requires soldiers to endure difficult 
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living conditions, heavy workloads, ambiguity, etc. Thus, it is simply not 
always feasible (or necessarily desirable) to reduce strain by reducing 
stressors. In contrast, it is theoretically and often practically feasible to 
reduce strain by affecting the moderating variables. For instance, if unit 
cohesion serves as a moderating effect akin to social support and protects 
soldiers from the severe stressors of combat (see Manning, 1991; Shils & 
Janowitz, 1948), then there may be practically feasible interventions that 
can be designed to help foster cohesions during garrison training (p.7).   
 
 Bliese and Castro (2003) describe strains as outcomes. Unlike Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984), they classify strains into three different categories: health, attitudes and 
performance. Again, they assume that strains can be identified, measured and indicate the 
existence of strain. In the SAM, health strains include physical and psychological health 
measures. Herein lies one of the differences between the SAM and Transactional Stress 
Model: classification of strains. Bliese and Castro would classify depression or post 
traumatic stress disorder as a health strain, whereas Lazarus and Folkman (1984) would 
classify it as psychological strain. Bliese and Castro (2003) describe individuals’ 
perceptions of their job or organization as “attitudinal strain.” However, the majority of 
organizational research uses this term to describe individual job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment. The SAM also emphasizes that strain can and should be 
measured at the individual, group/unit and organizational level.   
 
Conceptual Model 
 Elements of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and 
Bliese and Castro’s (2003) SAM provide the conceptual foundation for this study. This 
resultant model specifies moderators of the stress-strain relationship. The model supports 
this study’s conceptualization that organizational factors moderate the stressor-strain 
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relationship. The model is parsimonious and provides testable hypotheses about the 
relationships between variables.  
The variables identified and described in the model (represented graphically in 
Figure 1) are described in greater detail following a description of the conceptual model. 
Based on the model, it is proposed that stressors reported in combat have a direct 
relationship with behavioral outcomes. As posited by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and 
Bliese and Castro (2002), there is considerable individual variation in the second 
dynamic appraisal process of stressors and how to cope with them. Therefore, 
organizational factors which influence individual appraisal will be measured. The 
organizational moderator, leader support, will be measured at the group level. 
   








The proposed conceptual model, as depicted in Figure 1, has three primary 
elements. The elements are: 1) the objective stressors of combat and individual 
assessment of the danger of combat; 2) the organizational moderator of leader support; 












literature, operational definitions of the constructs will be described. Then, testable 
hypothesis regarding the differing constructs of interest will be proposed.  
 
Combat Stressors  
The overall purpose of combat is to break the opponent’s willingness to fight. 
This is accomplished by either killing them or subjecting them to hell- like conditions 
until they break down and can no longer endure the stress (Noy, 1991). Combat is 
chaotic, intense and highly destructive. The US Army’s (1994) primary document of the 
effects of combat lists a number of stressors identified in past battles: extensive 
casualties, isolation, viewing mass destruction and death, massing of firepower in small 
areas resulting in total destruction, loss of members in unit, large numbers of killed in 
action, large numbers of wounded in action, fighting on unfamiliar or less familiar 
terrain, continuing battle with little information, and killing civilians and enemy 
combatants (p. 10-1).  The US Army’s (1994) definition of combat stressors is, “any 
stressors occurring during the course of combat-related duties” (p. 2-1). 
There have been few psychometric scales developed to measure combat exposure. 
The self- report measure predominately used in the literature is the Combat Exposure 
Scale (CES) developed by Keane, et al. (1989). The CES is a seven-item scale which asks 
respondents to subjectively report their type of combat experience and number of times 
the specific situation occurred. An example question is: “Did you ever go on combat 
patrols or have other very dangerous duty?” The seven items are weighted differentially 
based on the severity of the experience (Keane et al., 1989).   
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A potential weakness of the CES is its inability to assess the combat veterans’ 
appraisal of their combat experience. To match Lazarus and Folkman’s model of 
transactional stress, it is important to assess both the objective experience and the 
veteran’s primary appraisal whether the stressor is irrelevant, benign-positive or stressful.  
There appears to be only one study that evaluates combat exposure’s relationship 
to post-combat interpersonal violence and aggression in non-PTSD diagnosed veterans.  
Beckham, Feldman, Kirby, Hertzberg and Moore (1997) studied interpersonal violence 
among Vietnam veterans comparing those with and without chronic posttraumatic stress 
disorder. The PTSD group was recruited from 17 help seeking combat veterans with 
PTSD at the Durham Veterans Affairs Medical Center Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Clinical Teams. The comparison group of 20 Non-PTSD diagnosed combat veterans was 
recruited through a prescreening mailing to a random sample of 200 Vietnam veterans 
who sought services within the previous year at the Durham Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center.  
Subjects were administered the Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD  
(Keane, Caddell, & Taylor, 1988). PTSD subjects scored above the recommended 
clinical cutoff score of 107. To be in the non-PTSD group, members scored below 89. To 
assess the stressor of combat exposure, subjects completed the CES (Keane et al., 1989). 
Overall, the average score fell in the moderate range of combat exposure. To assess the 
outcome of interpersonal violence, the subjects also completed Standard Family Violence 
Index (SFVI) which is the Violence Subscale of Straus’s (1979) Conflict Tactics Scale 
(CTS). The items on the subscale include the behaviors of throwing something at 
someone, pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, kicking, biting, beating up, threatening 
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with a gun or knife, or using a gun or knife on someone. Subjects report the number of 
times in the past year they have executed such behaviors. 
This study analyzed the main effects of age, socioeconomic status, PTSD and 
combat exposure. It found a significant relationship between PTSD and combat exposure. 
After controlling for all the covariates, combat exposure had a significant main effect on 
interpersonal violence level for combat exposure, independent of PTSD diagnosis. This is 
an important finding, but it must be considered in the context of its methodological 
weaknesses. The primary weakness of the study is its reliance on treatment seeking 
veterans recalling and describing combat events that happened decades prior. The data 
are vulnerable to inaccurate recall based on the elapsed time, as well as a tendency to 
exaggerate symptoms in treatment seeking groups. Another weakness is the small sample 
size. This study addresses some of these weaknesses through sufficient sample size, 
sampling method, unit level reporting of combat experiences and timely data collection.   
 
Leader Support as Organizational Moderator 
 
Introduction 
Of particular interest to military researchers is the concept of leader support as a 
moderator of combat stressors. Manning (1991) proposes that caring and competent 
leadership (described in this study as leader support) in the military is conceptually 
equivalent to the concept of social support in non-military settings. From the civilian 
occupational literature, Wykes and Whittington (1989) suggest that social support is 
important in reducing the negative effects of exposure to work related violence. Britt and 
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colleagues (2004) point out that understanding the role of leadership support in the 
stressor-strain relationship is important for two reasons. First, the military exposes 
soldiers to a wide range of stressors, from mild to potentially fatal (Adler & Mathews, 
1994; King, King, Fairbanks, Keane, & Adams, 1998). Secondly, extended exposure to 
stressors impedes mental health (Cohen & Williamson, 1991).  
To maintain a healthy military, leaders must understand how they can reduce the 
negative effects of stressors. One of the primary goals of occupational stress research is 
to identify ways to reduce stress by identifying potential buffers of the stressor strain 
relationship. Researchers have investigated organizational variables with the potential to  
ameliorate or reduce the negative impact of stressors, making employees more resilient to 
the negative effect of stressors (Bliese & Britt, 2001).  
Because of the powerful influence of leaders on subordinates, military researchers 
have focused a great deal of research on leadership behaviors. Leaders support in the 
form of supportive leader behavior consists of behaviors intended to provide 
psychological support for subordinates, especially in situations that are psychologically 
and physically distressing (Britt et al., 2004). Schat and Kelloway (2003) remarked on the 
paucity of research on social support buffering exposure to violence. 
Cobb (1976) defined social support as “information leading the subject to believe 
that he is cared for and loved, esteemed and a member of a network of mutual 
obligations” (p. 300). House (1981) distinguishes four kinds of social support: 
instrumental, emotional, informational and appraisal. Instrumental support is the 
willingness to directly do things for others and or give material aide. It can be the 
provision of financial aid, material resources and needed services. Instrumental aid may 
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help reduce stress by direct resolution of instrumental problems or by providing the 
recipient with increased time for activities such as relaxation, or entertainment. 
Instrumental support is also called aid, material support and tangible support.  
Emotional support provides care, love and sympathy. Emotional support enhances 
self-esteem by communicating that people are valued and accepted for their own worth 
and experiences despite any difficulties or personal faults (Cohen & Wills, 1985). 
Informational support is giving information that can be used by the receiver for coping 
with personal or environmental problems. It can be given informally or formally through 
training, and helps in defining, understanding and coping with problematic events (Schat 
& Kelloway, 2003). Appraisal support is providing feedback about personal functioning 
directed to enhancing self-esteem.  
Although House (1981) conceptually delineates different types of social support, 
Thoits (1986) points out that in naturalistic settings the kinds of social supports are not 
independent. For example, Barling (1998) found that individuals rated all forms of social 
support as being partially confounded with emotional support. This study’s 
conceptualization of measuring leader support as a cluster of behaviors measured at the 
group- level is therefore supported.  
Using stressor strain terminology an important question can be created, “Why 
might social support serve to buffer strain from high level stressors?” On a gross 
theoretical level, Fusilier, Ganster, and Mayes (1987) posit that social support interacts 
with stress to influence strain. Berger, Farmer, Glazer, Gudanowski, and Nair (2003) 
report that social support weakens the relationship between stressors and strains. Some 
researchers theorize that specific types of social support have different mechanisms of 
 
 24 
action. Even so, evaluation of theoretical proposals demonstrates there is still 
considerable overlap.  
Cohen and Wills (1985) speculate that individuals use informational support in 
two ways to counter perceived lack of control: 1) to reappraise stressors as benign, or 2) 
to suggest appropriate coping responses. For example, soldiers who perceive a future 
combat operation as extremely stressful may approach a leader and express their fear. In 
return supportive leaders may provide their assessment of the enemy’s known weakness, 
suggest tactics that have proven successful in similar operations in the past or through 
past performance increase the soldier’s confidence in their leadership. In this way, the 
support intervenes between the stressful event and a stress reaction by attenuating or 
preventing a stress appraisal response. For the person experiencing the stressor, the 
knowledge that persons can and will provide support may redefine the potential for harm 
that the stressor initially presents, and enhances their perceived ability to cope with the 
demands of the stressor. Several studies suggest that social support aids stress resistance 
by supplying people with the information that they are loved, appreciated and part of a 
network of caring individuals (Caplan, 1974; Cobb, 1976). This information enhances a 
feeling of mastery that Bowlby (1982) has related to our earliest attachment experiences 
(Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986). 
 Researchers theorize that appraisal support works by enhancing the person’s self 
esteem and thereby helping him or her to cope or master the stressor (Brown & Harris, 
1978; Cobb, 1976). This coping and seeking mastery fosters positive affect and reduces 
the damaging impacts of stress (Thoits, 1986).  Cohen and Wills (1985) suggest that 
appraisal support may counterbalance threats to self-esteem that commonly occur as a 
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response to stress appraisal. For soldiers in combat, Solomon, et al. (1986) state, “as 
combat is such a tremendously threatening event, it is not surprising that the existence of 
officer support might lead to the sense of mastery that the soldier so desperately seeks” 
(p. 1270). Leaders demonstrate appraisal support when they tell their subordinate how 
lethal and invulnerable they are to their enemies. House (1981) defines appraisal support 
as feedback about personal functioning directed at enhancing self esteem. Theoretically, 
appraisal support provides confirmation of social identity, which buffers members from 
negative appraisal of stressors (Bliese, & Britt, 2001; Cobb, 1976; Cohen and Wills, 
1985; House, 1981). House (1981) posits that when subordinates’ tasks or work 
environments are dangerous, monotonous, stressful or frustrating, supportive leader 
behaviors increase subordinate effort and satisfaction by enhancing leader-subordinate 
relationships and self confidence which in turn, lowers stress and anxiety and 
compensates for unpleasant aspects of the work. Feedback from supportive companions, 
which reassures and affirms, prevents the negative impact of stressors on the person’s 
self-concept by confirming and enhancing self-esteem and personal efficacy (Epley, 
1974; Gottlieb, 1983; Pearlin, Lieberman, Menaghan & Mullan, 1981).  
   Theoretically, emotional support provides a sense of belonging in a network of 
caring where persons are more capable of mastering stress (Cobb, 1976; Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Solomon et al., 1987). Specifically addressing victims of violence, emotional 
support provides resources that victimization removes. The provision of acceptance may 
prevent the assessment that the environment is threatening, untrustworthy and rejecting 
(Kaniasty & Norris, 1992; Kutash, 1978; Silver & Wortman, 1980). Leaders that reassure 
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their soldiers that they are part of a team that take care of each other is an example of 
emotional support.  
As Winnubst and Schabracq (1996) point out, social environment is not the only 
variable in the effectiveness of social support, but also the subject’s receptivity to social 
support. ODriscoll and Dewe (2001) state that individual differences moderate the 
effectiveness of social support; “that is, the relationship is stronger for some people and 
weaker or non-existent for other people, perhaps because some people value social 
support more than others” (p. 234).  Two ways that may explain the difference in 
effectiveness of social support are the subjective perception of the availability of social 
support and individual psychological differences.  
Social support has been measured with both objective measures of available 
support and the perceived availability of social support (Cohen & Wills, 1985). However, 
Kessler and McLeod’s (1985) review of the literature demonstrated that stress-buffering 
effects were found more consistently when social support was measured as a perception 
that one’s network was ready to provide aid and assistance if needed. Research shows 
that perceived support is in general more important than received support in predicting 
adjustment to stressful life events (Henderson et al., 1981; Wethington & Kessler 1986). 
For this reason social support is generally operationalized in terms of perceptions of the 
recipient (Ganster, Victor, 1988; Wethington & Kessler 1986). Speculating on why 
perceived support is more effective than objective measures of support, Cohen and Wills 
(1985) propose that the buffering qualities of social support are cognitive and work by 
affecting one’s interpretation of the stressor. It is possible that people who perceive 
themselves as having ready access to support are more likely than others to elicit 
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supportive behaviors when a crisis occurs in their lives (Wethington & Kessler, 1986). 
Cohen and McCay (1984) similarly describe the possibility that the perception of having 
access to social support protects against distress by affecting the subject’s appraisal of the 
situation.  
 Other researchers argue that the effects of perceived support are spurious and can 
be explained by intra-psychic characteristics that negatively affect the evaluation of 
support availability (Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Dodson, & Shrout, 1984; Fusilier, 
Ganster, & Mayes, 1987; Henderson et al., 1981; Wethington & Kessler, 1986). 
Dohrenwend, et al. (1984) state,”some types of social support are consequences of 
personal dispositions in general and psychopathology in particular” (p. 229). They also 
propose that measures of social support may in fact be measuring the respondents’ 
habitual pattern of constructing elements in their day-to-day life (Dohrenwend et al., 
1984). Gottlieb (1983) argues that individual differences in social competence and 
disposition related to empathic responses deserve study because they may affect people’s 
access to social support and their skills in rendering social support. 
 Of particular interest in this study is the potential effect that Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) has on an individual’s perception of and access to the beneficial effects 
of social support. Solomon and Mikulincer (1990) found that combat related PTSD may 
impair the veteran’s social functioning and create a negative social network orientation. 
Keane, Scott, Chavoya, Lamparski and Fairbank (1985) found that although Vietnam 
veterans with PTSD reported having “pre-military” social support equivalent to control 
groups, they reported a decrease in social support from the time of their discharge.  
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There may be a number of individual factors, resulting from PTSD, that potentially 
increase or decrease the effect of or receptivity to social support. PTSD symptoms, 
especially numbing of responsiveness, diminished interest in significant activities, 
feelings of detachment from others (Hanley, 1975; Hendin & Hass-Pollinger, 1984) and 
elevated levels of hostility (Hendin & Hoss-Pollinger, 1984) could be detrimental to their 
relationship with their social support and their ability to benefit from or perceive the 
benefit of social support (Solomon & Mikulincer, 1990).  
Stress is assumed to affect persons with strong social support less adversely than 
it affects persons with weak social support. Research on the buffering hypothesis has 
moved toward greater definition specificity and has increasingly matched the type of 
support to the expected strain (Beehr, 1995; Beehr, Farmer, Glazer, Gudanowski, & Nair, 
2003; Cohen & McKay, 1984; Hobfoll, 1990; Kaniasty & Norris, 1992). Viswesvaran’s 
(1999) meta-analysis suggested that theoretical attention needs to be given to the types of 
social support expected to moderate effects of specific types of stressors (Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Ganster, 1988; Ganster et al., 1986; House, 1981; Pratt & Barling, 1988; Tetrick & 
LaRocco, 1987). For example, in their seminal literature review of social support 
literature, Cohen and Wills (1985) posited that “there must be a reasonable match 
between the coping requirements and the available support in order for buffering to 
occur” (p. 315). 
 
Social and Leader Support Research  
Both military and civilian based organizational stress literature focuses on formal 
supervisory support (as opposed to peer support) to understand the effects of social 
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support (Bliese & Castro, 2000; Manning, 1991; Winnubst & Schabracq, 1996). Leather, 
Lawrence, Beale, and Cox (1998) found that formal leadership support has a more 
positive impact on the negative effects of occupational exposure to stressors than 
informal support (which may originate from family, friends or coworkers). Supportive 
behaviors from within the immediate organizational context are expected to have stronger 
affect on perceptions than supportive behaviors originating outside the immediate 
organization (Indik, 1968; Schneider, 1983).  This appears to hold true even when there is 
quantifiably more perceived informal support available (Beehr, 1995; Bliese & Castro, 
2000; House & Wells, 1978; Kobasa & Puccettis, 1983; LaRocco, House & French, 
1980; Leather , 1998; Marcelissen, 1987; Rosen & Moghadam, 1988). In the ir study of 
the Israeli Army, Solomon, Mikulincer, and Hobfoll (1986) found that unit Officer 
Support was the most impactful variable among different measures of social support. 
Leather, , (1998) suggested that support from within the organization is best placed to 
help employees develop and sustain problem-focused coping strategies. Kobasa and 
Puccettis (1983) posited that the relative effectiveness of supervisor support in this 
context is probably attributable to the match between stressful events and support 
functions provided in the work setting. Social or contextual factors may ameliorate the 
negative effects of stressors. Bliese and Castro (2000) found evidence demonstrating that 
contextual factors (e.g., leadership climate) in Army Companies moderated relationships 
between individual stressors and individual strains. Specific to this study, these findings 
provide justification for the selection of leader support (instead of other types of social 
support) as a moderating variable.  
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 Historically there have been a number of methodological weaknesses in social 
support studies. The use of clinical samples restricted the desirable sample characteristic 
of broad ranges of stress, social support and symptomatology. Cohen and Wills (1985) 
point out that numerous social support studies lack the methodological strength for 
testing the buffering model as a significant modifier of stressors and strains. Low 
reliability or validity of support measures also reduces the probability of showing either 
main or interaction effects. Unfortunately, many investigators used scales that were 
created post hoc from large data sets or created their own scales without psychometric 
testing or development. Others used single- item measures that almost necessarily have 
low reliability. Although most of these scales have some face validity, formal 
psychometric data are seldom reported (Cohen & Wills, 1985). Also, some scales are 
more sensitive to measuring recent stress or personality factors than social support. The 
prospective design assumes that predictor variables remain relatively stable over the 
period of prediction.  Measuring support, especially perceived availability, might 
fluctuate considerably over long periods. These methodological and psychometric 
deficiencies potentially reduce the probability of demonstrating a buffering effect. 
 Another problem is that the social support measures often reflect subjective 
perceptions of support rather than their objective existence. Whereas some researchers 
have noted that perceived support is what is important (e.g., Henderson, Byrne, & 
Duncan-Jones, 1981), others have argued that this confounds the environmental nature of 
support with personal attributes (e.g., Dohrenwend & Shrout, 1985; Solomon & 
Mikulincer, 1990).   
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Winnubst and Schabracq (1996) point out another issue with measuring social 
support. They address the problem that when measuring social support using individual 
measures, “it is unclear whether one is measuring (a) individual differences in 
perceptions of support, (b) actual contextual differences in support, or (c) some 
combination of individual difference and context. This brings to light the issue of level of 
analysis. Ambiguity about which “level of analysis” (individual or group) is best to 
measure the buffering effects of support may explain the rather inconsistent findings even 
though the theoretical rationale appears sound (Britt, 1997). Bliese and Britt (2001) 
discuss the problems of analyzing the buffering effects of social or contextual factors, 
which requires mixing levels of analysis. They point out that stressors and strains are 
typically measured at the individual level while contextual effects are measured as group 
level constructs. This can result in potential mismatching across levels of measurement 
and requires particular attention to how models are specified and tested. They suggest 
measuring social support as a contextual variable, stating that a group’s average rating of 
social support is potentially more accurate in measuring actual social support provided.  
This view of social support is similar to the view of leadership behaviors 
suggested by Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, and Popper (1998). Specifically, Shamir, et al. 
argued that charismatic leader behaviors in military units tend to be ambient behavior 
directed at the unit as a whole. Bliese and Britt (2001) also take the position that the 
behaviors that leaders perform to create a supportive environment also tend to be directed 
towards the entire unit and thus provide a theoretical justification for treating the 
construct as a group- level variable (p.57). They found that Army companies with 
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positive social environments have members who are buffered from the negative effects of 
stressors (Bliese & Britt, 2001).   
 In military research, especially that which assesses contextual variables, the Army 
Company is the appropriate group size to research, because companies are well-
established groups. Bliese and Britt (2001) state that, “the quality of company leadership 
influences nearly every facet of the work environment for soldiers” (p.55). Bliese and 
Halverson (1996) point out that most work related policies that impact a soldier’s quality 
of life are made at the company level. In addition, when soldiers deploy to combat, they 
normally do so as a Company (Gavin & Hoffman, 2002; Jex & Thomas, 2003) and 
therefore are likely required to perform in a somewhat similar task environment.   
Bliese and Britt (2002) discuss the dynamics of Army Companies and report that 
members work interdependently and exit barriers make exit difficult for members to 
leave the group. There are several reasons to believe that the group level perspective is 
appropriate in measuring the effect of leadership social support.  Bliese and Halverson 
(2002) articulate the conceptual distinction once level of analysis moves from individual 
to group rating of social support: 
Note once again that there are subtle yet important differences in meaning 
between leadership support when defined as an individual soldier’s perception 
(influenced by individual experiences) and defined in terms of the average 
perceptions of an entire Army Company. The climate in a unit where on average, 
soldiers provide low leadership support ratings is likely to be important even for 
an individual soldier that views leadership support positively (p. 57). 
 
Although early theorists may have hoped social support would be a panacea in the 
stress-distress relation (Cobb, 1976), more recent thinking suggests a more moderate, 
albeit meaningful, contribution (Champoux & Peters, 1987; Evans, 1985; Hobfoll, 1985; 
Hobfoll & Walfish, 1984; Leather, Lawrence, Beale & Cox, 1998; Schat & Kelloway, 
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2003; Solomon, 1985; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986). Viswesvaran’s social 
support literature review (1999) found a generally negative relationship between social 
support and measures of psychological strain, but stated that the correlations were often 
only in the teens or near 0.20. Zapf, et al. (1986) posit that given the multivariant nature 
of health, any single work stressor is unlikely to account for more than 4 to 7 percent of 
the variance in stressor strain relationships. Studying the effect of organizational support 
on exposure to aggression and violence, Leather, et al. (1998) found that organizational 
support had both consistent and significant direct effects upon psychological outcomes by 
explaining 2 percent to 13 percent of the variance. Specific to perception of officer 
support Solomon, et al. found only a modest (6.2 percent to 10.1 percent of explained 
variance) effect on psychological strain in Israeli combat veterans, which they point out 
as consistent with most reports of the effect of social support on stress outcome.    
  Leather, et al. (1998) studied the buffering effects of intra-organizational support 
on occupational violence. The population that they queried (through mailed surveys) was 
242 United Kingdom alcohol drinking establishment workers. The survey contained both 
biographical and demographic information. Importantly, the survey took the objective 
stressor measurement approach by asking for the number of aggressive and violent 
incidents that the subjects observed at their work. They were asked how often each type 
of aggressive or violent incidents occurred: shouting and abusive language, pushing 
shoving, one-to-one fight (no weapons), one-to-one fighting (weapons), more than two 
fighting (no weapons) and more than two fighting (weapons). The researchers 
investigated the moderating effects of perceived intra-organizational support by asking 
respondents whether they received organizational support from: line manager, training 
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department, personnel department and security department. Respondent’s perceptions 
were evaluated by subjects responses to “not at all supportive” through “could not have 
been more supportive.” The researchers also sought the amount of perceived support 
from family and friends on the same scale from “not at all supportive” through “could not 
have been more supportive.” Researchers conceptualized the dependent variable (strain) 
as reported job satisfaction, organizational commitment and well-being. Of most 
importance was well being which was measured through two factors: “worn out” and “up 
tight and tense.” “Worn out” measured symptoms of tiredness, emotional lability and 
cognitive confusion. “Up tight and tense” measured symptoms related to worry, fear, 
tension and physical signs of anxiety.  
Leather, et al. demonstrated that perceived social support ameliorated some of the 
effects of work related violence. Further, they demonstrated that only intra-organizational 
as opposed to family or friend support, was significant. Of particular note, the researchers 
found the buffering effects for organizational support strengthened as the level of 
violence increased. Overall, though the findings were significant, the effect size was 
small. Between 2 percent and 13 percent of the variance in the dependent variables was 
explained. Specifically, 6 percent of the variance in the dependent variable “worn out” 
was explained, as well as 5 percent of the variance in the dependent variable “up tight 
and tense.”  
Shat and Kalloway (2003) studied the effect of two types of organizational 
support: instrumental and informational on workplace violence and aggression. Their 
study was based on surveys from 225 employees in a health care setting. Specifically the 
researchers investigated how organizational support buffered the effects of workplace 
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physical violence, psychological aggression and vicarious violence on the outcome 
measures of: fear, emotional well-being, somatic health, job-related affect and job 
neglect.  
The researchers used an objective measure of physical violence by asking about 
frequency of physically violent behaviors (e.g., being hit, kicked, threatened with a 
weapon) the respondents had experienced at work in the past year. Psychological 
aggression was similarly measured by frequency of being yelled at or being sworn at. 
Vicarious violence, or the witnessing or “hearing about” violence perpetrated in the work 
place, was measured by frequency reported in the last year. The moderators, perception 
of organizational support, were individually measured. Instrumental support at the co-
worker, supervisor and management level was assessed. Respondents were asked to score 
the following question: “My coworkers provide support when I experience an aggressive 
or violent situation at work” on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree through strongly 
agree.  Informational support was measured on whether respondents had received training 
(yes or no) on how to deal with aggression or violence at work.  Emotional wellbeing was 
measured using the General Health Questionnaire (see Banks et al. for specific 
discussion).  
Instrumental support was found to significantly moderate the effects of workplace 
violence on emotional well being, explaining 3 percent to 6 percent of the variance in the 
outcome.  Overall, the researchers found that when the respondents experienced the three 
factors of workplace violence (physical violence, psychological aggression and vicarious 
violence), organizational support was associated with a reduction in negative 
psychological health consequences.  However, there are methodological reasons that 
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these finding may not specifically relate to the current study. Specifically, the sample 
respondents were predominately female (86%). As has been pointed out, females may be 
more receptive to social support, and the current study’s sample is predominately male.  
 
Leader Support Research with Military Samples  
The following studies use active duty populations as they investigate the effect of 
organizational support. The first two articles, primarily authored by Solomon were 
conducted by the Israeli Defense Force; the subsequent studies were performed by the 
WRAIR. Not only do these Israeli samples contain subjects that are active duty military, 
they also use a combat experience to measure stress. The following two studies were 
conducted by personnel at the WRAIR, and though they look at an active duty US Army 
sample, they use peace keeping operations as the stressor.  
Solomon, Mikulincer, and Hobfoll (1986) studied the buffering effect of Israeli 
Army Officer emotional support on the likelihood of male “front line combat” soldiers 
developing combat stress reactions (CSR). CSR is a cluster of combat-related reactions 
that manifest in numerous symptomatology: restlessness, psychomotor retardation, 
psychological withdrawal, startle reactions, confusion, nausea, vomiting and paranoid 
reactions (for an in depth description see Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM-22 
Leaders’ manual for combat stress control, 1994). Their study carefully matched 382 
Israeli Lebanon War veterans who developed CSR (diagnosed by professionals both 
trained and experienced in diagnosing and treating combat related stress reactions) with a 
control group of 382 Israeli Lebanon War veterans who reported the same level of 
combat intensity and participated in the same battles, but did not develop CSR.  
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Unlike the studies sited previously, the researchers measured reported perception 
of the stressor (battle intensity). Soldiers indicated how threatening they perceived their 
combat experience to be. Perception of social support by officers was measured using the 
Military Company Environment Inventory (see Moos, 1973 for a detailed description). 
 The researchers found that the CSR and the control group differed significantly 
only on Officer emotional support (p < .01) and perceived battle intensity (p < .01). 
Officer emotional support explained 10.1 percent, and battle intensity added 2.5 percent, 
of the variance. Based on this regression, CSR soldiers rated battle as more intense and 
felt less officer emotional support. Of particular interest in these findings is the impact of 
officer emotional support on perceived battle intensity. What must be considered is that 
soldiers with CSR and soldiers in the control group both experienced high levels of 
objective stressors in the form of combat, which the researchers argue is a high level of 
stress for all participants.  
 From the same study, Solomon, Mikulincer, and Hobfoll (1987) studied the 
differences between subjective measures of stress and social support as predictors of 
CSR. The study used the same subjective measures of both stress and social support. 
However, this study also included objective measures of both stress and social support. 
 The researchers measured objective stress with the following questions: Did they 
actively participate in frontline battles? Had they received specific training that prepared 
them for their military role in battles? Were they near the front line during the war? Had 
they participated in activities related to the evacuation of dead soldiers? The article states 
that “The index of objective stress was computed by counting the soldier’s stressful 
experiences during the war” (p. 579). The researchers measured objective social support 
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by asking whether the subjects had previously fought or trained with the unit they fought 
with during the war.  
Both of these measures must be considered as rather weak. The objective measure 
of stress or combat experience is poorly articulated and therefore would seem to limit the 
discriminating power of the measure. The objective measure of support only measures 
whether the soldier was assigned to the unit prior to fighting. The construct of support 
needs further articulation examining the support available in the unit. To be meaningful, 
objective measures of support should evaluate the amount and type of support provided, 
not just whether the soldier had prior experience with the unit.  
The researchers conducted a hierarchical regression on CSR, entering socio-
demographic information (age, education) first, followed by objective factors (stress and 
unit support) and finally subjective factors (stress and unit support). The objective 
measure of stress was found to be significant (p < .01); the objective measure of support 
was not. The researchers combined the two objective measures and reported 2.3 percent 
of variance explained. Both of the subjective measures (stress and support) were 
significant (p < .01) and combined explained 8.3 percent of the variance. The researchers 
point out that both subjective and objective indicators of event stressfulness and social 
support were predictive of CSR. 
The following three studies all originated out of the WRAIR, which is the US 
Army’s medical research branch of MEDCOM. In their review of WRAIR research, 
Britt, et al. (2004) state, “Researchers at the WRAIR have examined the role of 
leadership as a predictor of stress, as a buffer against the negative effects of stress and, as 
a variable that predicts or enables variables that have been fount to decrease the adverse 
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effects of stress” (p. 541). The Neuropsychiatry branch of the WRAIR is staffed by 
uniformed research psychologists and social workers. Castro (in press) states “that the 
military scientist plays a critical role in providing scientifically valid findings to inform 
the commander when making decisions on how to improve soldier and unit readiness” 
(p.2). The military literature terms organizational supervisory support as leader 
supportive behaviors (Bliese, Halverson, & Schriesheim, 2002). As noted in the 
introduction to this section, Manning (1991) proposes that caring and competent 
leadership in the military is conceptually equivalent to the concept of social support in 
non-military settings. The following studies were conducted in peacekeeping or training 
situations. Given that the participants are drawn from the US Army, and that these studies 
focus on leader support as a moderator of military stressors, these studies may be the 
most pertinent to this review.  
Bliese and Castro (2001) investigated whether the perception of Non-
Commissioned Officers’ (NCOs) (soldiers’ immediate supervisors) supportive behaviors 
moderated the relationship between the stress of occupational demands and the 
psychological strain. Their cross sectional survey data was collected from 1538 lower 
enlisted (Privates through Specialists) male soldiers from 53 Company sized elements. 
All of the soldiers were members of the same Brigade Combat Team while preparing for 
a training exercise.  
The researchers measured occupational demand by using the role overload scale 
from the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionaire (Cammann, Fichman, 
Jenkins, & Klesh, 1983). An example item is “I have so much work to do, I cannot do 
everything well.” Soldiers responded on a point scale whether they strongly disagreed 
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through strongly agreed. Organizational support was measured by three items: 1) The 
NCOs in my unit are interested in my personal welfare, 2) The NCOs in my unit let 
soldiers’ know when they have done a good job, and 3) The NCOs in my unit are 
interested in what I think and how I feel about things. In this study, organizational 
support was treated as a contextual variable. To support this conceptualization Bliese and 
Halverson (2001) state “NCO support is assumed to be a shared environmental variable 
that measurably differs across the 53 companies” (p. 67). This was established by 
“meaning” the within company ratings of social support. Psychological strain was 
measured using the General Severity Index of the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis & 
Melisaratos, 1983). 
Step 1 of the multi- level analysis found that NCO support had a significant, 
negative main effect to psychological strain. The final step tested whether NCO support 
was a significant predictor of the variation (between companies) in the role overload 
psychological strain slope. This suggests that units with high NCO support (taken as a 
contextual variable) will have lower levels of individual psychological strain compared to 
units with lower NCO support, who will have higher psychological strain.  
Bliese, et al. (2002) investigated whether supportive leadership buffered the 
relationship between the subject’s perception of task significance and their self reports of 
hostility. The researchers used a standard multiple regression statistical analysis, or 
individual level analysis. The authors point out that individual level analysis fails to 
include contextual variables, such as shared with- in group exposures like leadership 
behaviors. In other words, individual analysis fails to assess the amount of variance in 
any one individual’s response that can be explained by group membership. The sources 
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of the data were surveys from 2042 US Army soldiers across 49 US Army Companies 
deployed to Haiti for Operation Restore Democracy in 1994. The sample was 
predominately male (95%).  
The researchers assessed the strain of task significance. The moderator (social 
support), which the researchers labeled “leadership climate”, was assessed using 11 
items. Examples of the questions are: “My officers are interested in my personal 
welfare,” My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.” The 
strain, hostility, was assessed using the hostility subscale of the BSI (Derogatis & 
Spencer, 1982). The scale asks the subjects to report their past actions, such as getting 
into arguments in the last week. Responses were on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
“None” to “Extreme.” 
Using a hierarchical regression analysis, the researchers found that both task 
significance and leadership climate were significantly related to self-reports of hostility. 
However, when the researchers evaluated whether leadership buffered the task- 
significance relationship to hostility, findings were insignificant. The results provided no 
support for the hypothesis that leadership climate (social support) buffers the strain 
stressor relationship. Of particular note is that the findings were not significant with such 
a large sample which provided sufficient power to detect even small interactions. The 
researchers further analyzed the data by estimating the non- independence and reliability 
of group (company) mean differences. The researchers found that group membership 
significantly related to individual responses, group means reliably differed on the 
variables of interest, and leadership climate had a reasonable level of average with-in 
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group agreement. These findings create the basis for the following articles that use multi-
level statistical analysis on the same data base.      
Bliese and Halverson (2002) used the above database and the multi- level 
statistical analysis technique of random group re-sampling (RGR) to investigate whether 
a group level model of stress buffering was viable. Using the group level perspective they 
proposed that the average perceptions of leadership climate (social support) within the 49 
US Army companies moderated the relationship between task significance and unit 
hostility. Using an unweighted group means analysis, they found significant buffering 
effects. They then analyzed the data with RGR to see whether the effects were a result of 
aggregation effects (grouping effects) or whether the effects were a function of group 
level properties of the data (group effects).  For the purpose of this discussion a simple 
description is given (for a detailed exposition on how RGR works see Bliese & 
Halverson, 2002).  
RGR randomly assigns individuals to false groups (for the purpose of analysis) 
that contain the same number of individuals. The false groups outcome score is averaged 
and another regression is conducted. If the false groups demonstrate the same 
relationships among variables as real groups, then it provides evidence that the findings 
are not the result of group effects, but rather grouping effects. However, if the random 
reassignment results in dissimilar findings, then this provides evidence that interactions 
among variables in the actual groups are a result of group effects and not grouping 
effects. The researchers found the interaction was related to the group level properties of 
the data, and not the by product of the aggregation process. Only in actual groups were 
significant interaction results found. This provides support for the hypothesis that at the 
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group level, average perception of support moderated the average perceptions of task 
significance and average levels of hostility (in this case, the unit’s stress of performing 
tasks of low significance will be ameliorated against the strain of hostility when 
leadership of the group is supportive ).  
Gavin and Hofmann (2002) used another method of multi level analysis, 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), to evaluate the same hypothesis with the same data 
as the above referenced article. For the purpose of this discussion a simple description is 
provided (for an in-depth discussion of HLM see Bryk & Raudenbush 2002; Gavin & 
Hofmann, 2002).  
HLM can be used to assess the impact of both individual (e.g., individual 
perception of leadership support) and group (e.g., group perception of leadership support) 
level predictors on an individual level outcome. HLM is also used to assess the 
moderating effects of group level variables on relationships between individual level 
variables. HLM is particularly useful in this ana lysis. The researchers are interested in 
predictors of individual hostility in organizations. HLM allows researchers to assess 
individual strains (e.g., task significance) and group level moderators (e.g., leadership 
support) on individual strains (e.g., hostility).   
Gavin and Hofmann (2002) found that leadership climate (aggregated social 
support) moderated the relationship between an individual’s perceived task significance 
and their experienced hostility. The amount that leadership moderated the relationship 
between an individual’s perceived task significance and their experienced hostility varied 
significantly between groups. The shared leadership climate predicted this variability. In 
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companies with higher supportive leadership the effects of task significance were reduced 
in individuals.  
 
Summary of the Literature Review 
The literature review examined both conceptual and empirical research findings 
concerning combat stressors, and leadership support to operationally define key 
constructs and to guide the development of a conceptual model. The literature review 
disclosed a number of issues related to combat stressors and their effect on post combat 
aggression and violence.  
First, there are no studies that have examined the relationship between combat 
stressors, attachment style (based on adverse childhood experiences), leader support and 
post-combat aggression and violence. Second, there is only one related study that 
investigates the relationship between combat stressors and post-combat violence. The 
study found a significant relationship. However, although interesting, the study does not 
provide any information on how to reduce post-combat violence other than by avoiding 
combat stressors. This seems insufficient; more knowledge about this area is needed. 
Only with increased understanding will potential interventions and organizational 
changes be possible. Third, the majority of social support studies that investigate 
organizational supervisory support are conducted at the individual level. As discussed in 
the attachment theory section, some individuals are less receptive to support or more 
hostile to supervisors. From this point of view, ratings of actual support may be biased by 
the individual. Some organization support studies have treated leader support as a 
contextual variable by aggregating the group’s leader support score to the mean. This 
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approach, averaging group scores, is thought to potentially be a more accurate measure of 
actual leader support. This is a key point. For this reason, this study will use a multiple 
regression of the aggregated group scores to evaluate whether group membership matters, 
in the sense that group membership means exposure to the same level of leader support.  
 
Review of Conceptual Model   
 Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress is the basis for this 
model. It is used to explain the stressor strain relationship. Transactional stress theory 
conceptualized strain as the result of an imbalance between the demands of a person’s 
environment and his or her available resources to respond. First the individual appraises 
the situation as to whether it is a threat or not. Second the individual appraises his or her 
resources to cope with the stressor. If coping strategies fail to alleviate the stressor the 
individual will experience strain. Bliese and Castro’s (2003) The SAM is also used to 
develop the conceptual model. The SAM provides the additional component of 
organizational moderators as contextual variables, which alleviate or buffer the stressor in 
its rela tionship to strain. 
 Leader support, known in civilian organizational stress literature as social support, 
is conceptualized as an organizational contextual moderator of the stressor strain 
relationship. Support from supervisors has been found to buffer individual’s strain in 
reaction to the stressor of work place violence. There are numerous types of social 
support described in the literature; however, what appears to be salient is that perceived 
support buffers better than actual support. This issue supports the conceptualization of 
leader support as a contextual variable. This means that the average group-score for 
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leader support may be a more accurate measure of perceived leader support than 
individual scores.     
 
Hypotheses 
 Three hypotheses will be tested in this study. 
H1: Units with high perceived combat experience (UPDD and UCE) will report more 
post-combat aggression and violence than units with low perceived combat experience.  
H2: Units with high unit leader support (ULS) will report less post-combat aggression 
and violence (AG) than units with low unit leader support.  
H3: Unit leader support (ULS) will moderate the relationship between unit combat 
exposure (UCE) and post-combat aggression and violence (AG).   
 
 
Figure 2.  
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 This study attempts to answer the primary research question: “at the company 
level, what are the effects of supportive leader behaviors on the relationship between 
combat experience and post-conflict aggression and violence?” This study is a secondary 
analysis of a portion of the Land Combat Study (LCS) conducted by research personnel 
at WRAIR. Permission to use the data for this study was provided by the Commanding 
Officer of WRAIR. The data were collected from active duty soldiers (N=7650) assigned 
to five combat brigades deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and 2004. The 
surveys were administered to soldiers at their home stations approximately three to four 
months post combat. The responses from the soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry 
Division (ID) were collected in December 2003 following their eight-month combat 
deployment to Iraq. The 3rd ID spearheaded early ground combat operations in Iraq, 
March through May 2003. The responses from the soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division 
were collected in the spring and summer of 2004, following their 12-month combat 
deployment in Iraq. The responses from the soldiers of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) 
Division were collected in May 2004, following their 12 months of combat operations in 
Iraq.  
The three-month post combat interval allowed time for soldiers to take leave, 
transition to garrison duty, and afforded soldiers the chance to seek mental health and 
medical treatment if needed. An overview of the original study is provided as background 
information (Hoge et al., 2004).   
 
 48 
For this study, the data was reviewed and soldiers with missing responses were 
removed from the data set (N=5766). The remaining 5766 soldiers reported being 
assigned to one of 116 identified company level groups. Group histograms were 
developed and reviewed for normalcy. Four groups were discarded based on atypical 
distribution of perception of unit leader support scores (see Appendix E.). This reduced 
the data set (N=5435) and number of groups to 112. The number of members per group 
ranges from two to 151, with an average of 50 members per group.  
 
Background of the Original Study 
 The LCS is a longitudinal assessment of Soldiers and Marines deployed in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The 
survey is titled: “Impact of PERSTEMPO and deployment experiences on the mental 
health and functioning of soldiers and their families.” The LCS includes data from over 
40,000 anonymous surveys. The surveys have been collected at various points in the 
deployment cycle (pre-deployment, during deployment in Iraq/Afghanistan, and three-, 
six- and twelve-months post deployment) (Castro & Cox, 2005).  
 Units were selected based on their participation in combat. WRAIR personnel 
initially coordinated with Brigade level staff to establish collection dates and subordinate 
units. The Brigade staff tasked their subordinate units to provide specific numbers of 
soldiers to be surveyed at designated locations. The LCS uses a non-probability sampling 
method combining both purposive and availability sampling techniques. Hoge, et al. 
(2004), reporting from the same data, found that 58 percent of the soldiers from the 
selected units were available to attend the data collections. Hoge, et al. (2004) further 
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stated that most soldiers not attending the briefings were unavailable because of their 
rigorous work and training schedules. Hoge and colleagues (2004) assessed that the LCS 
sample was representative of all active duty Army personnel deployed to OIF by 
comparing participant’s demographic characteristics to all Army personnel having been  
deployed to OIF using the Defense Medical Surveillance System.  
 There are three primary goals of the LCS: 1) identify the impact of combat on the 
behavioral health of soldiers, marines and families, 2) provide leaders feedback on 
soldiers perceptions of current well being, and 3) determine effective behavioral health 
prevention and early intervention procedures to protect soldiers and marines from the 
stressors of combat (Castro & Cox, 2005). The LCS took soldiers approximately 45 
minutes to complete, and contained 243 questions. The LCS’s components identify the 
prevalence of mental health problems by asking about current symptoms (anxiety 
disorders, depressive disorders, PTSD, alcohol and illegal drug abuse, health risk 
behavior and significant marital dysfunction) in soldiers deployed in support of OEF and 
OIF. Additionally, the LCS collected data on combat experiences as well demographic 
information and soldier’s family mental health history.  Researchers collected data with 
the intention of identifying potential moderators of the stressor strain relationship (social 
support, leadership, cohesion). The LCS also collected data on perception and use of 
mental health services. WRAIR personnel included preexisting instruments, modified 
preexisting instruments, and developed other instruments for inclusion in the LCS. 
 With the assistance of Brigade level staffs, WRAIR personnel coordinated with 
local commanders to establish data collection times and locations. Unit leaders assembled 
the soldiers in areas near their workplaces at times determined by them. For example, one 
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group of 300 soldiers were surveyed in their unit chapel and another group of ten soldiers 
were surveyed in their maintenance area. WRAIR personnel gave a short recruitment 
briefing and obtained written informed consent that contained statements about the 
purpose of the survey and that participation was voluntary.  
To ensure anonymity, soldiers were given a manila envelope with two consent 
forms. Soldiers kept one copy for themselves, then filled out the other and returned it in 
the manila envelope. Soldiers were instructed that if they did not want to participate in 
the survey, they should return a blank consent form to the manila envelope. All consent 
envelopes were collected prior to soldiers beginning the survey. Consent forms remained 
separated from self-report instruments through the use of separate storage containers. 
This process had the effect of ensuring the self-report data were anonymous. The consent 
forms with personal identification data were maintained separately from instruments 
which did not contain personal identification. The sealed envelope process also allowed 
soldiers to refuse participation in the survey without being identified by researchers, 
leaders or peers.  
 
Instrumentation 
 The data used for this study, is a component of the LCS. The LCS was designed 
to be a multi-dimensional survey. For the purpose of this study, components of the LCS 
were selected to measure concepts of interest (Appendices A-D): combat experience, 
appraisal of danger of combat experience, leader support and aggression and violence.  
 This study creates unit level variables by aggregating individual soldier’s scores 
within a unit (US Army Company). In the case of combat experience, military 
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researchers have found the relationship between combat stressors and combat strain is 
best predicted by assessing unit level variables (US Army, 1994). Klein and colleagues 
(1994) suggested that aggregating individual scores to make group level measures is 
appropriate when items direct the respondent’s attention to group level variables. Gavin 
and Hoffman (2002) suggested that leadership behaviors can be best characterized as a 
group level variable. The underlying assumption is individual members of a given 
company, with common leaders, are exposed to similar leadership environment in terms 
of leader behaviors and actions. This treatment is consistent with Shamir and colleagues 
(1998) aggregation decision based on the argument that leaders often engage in behaviors 
which are not directed toward specific individuals but toward the unit as a whole.   
For conceptual clarity, the unit is defined as the soldier’s “company.” Companys 
are the lowest level of command where the commander retains judicial authority over the 
soldiers (Bliese & Castro, 2000; Jex & Bliese, 1999). Typically, companys are 
commanded by a Captain (pay grade O-3) and First Sergeant (pay grade E-8). Companys 
are normally comprised of three or four subordinate platoons of soldiers, with a platoon 
leader (officer) and a platoon sergeant (NCO) as their leaders. Each platoon is typically 
comprised of three or four squad-sized elements with an NCO assigned as the squad 
leader.   
 
Predictor Variables 
Level of Unit Combat Exposure  (UCE) (Appendix A.) The stressor, combat 
exposure, was measured with 11 combat specific experience questions. Soldiers 
responded with one of the following responses: (1) never, (2) one time, (3) two to four 
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times, (4) five to nine times, (5) ten or more times. For example, soldiers were asked 
whether they had: been attacked/ambushed, received small arms fire, engaged in hand-to-
hand combat, or been responsible for the death of an enemy combatant. Total scores were 
obtained by summing the values for each item, with total scores ranging from 0 to 65. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of combat exposure. WRAIR personnel developed 
these items with the assistance of combat veterans who characterized the types of combat 
situations faced in OIF. Using criteria provided by Springer, Abell, & Nugent (2000), 
these items have acceptable psychometric properties, with a Cronbach’s reliability 
coefficient of .81, for decision making with individuals. Unit soldier’s scores were 
aggregated to create the unit level variable. 
Level of Unit Perceived Danger (UPD) (Appendix B.) In keeping with Lazarus 
and Folkman’s (1984) emphasis on the appraisal of stressors in understanding the 
relationship between stressors and strain, a question about perception of danger during 
combat was asked. Respondents were asked how often they thought they were in danger 
of being injured or killed. Subjects responded (1) never, (2) once or twice, (3) sometimes, 
(4) many times. This question was developed by WRAIR personnel. Total scores range 
from 1-4, with higher scores indicating higher levels of appraised stress based on combat 
exposure. Unit’s soldier’s scores were aggregated to create the unit level variable.   
Level of Unit Leader Support (ULS) (Appendix C.) A combination of four 
items was used to assess the degree to which individuals perceived their unit leaders to be 
supportive. Soldiers were asked to rate how oft en unit officers behaved in specified 
manners. Soldiers could respond (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) 
always. As previously described, social support or leader support behavior is a four 
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dimensional construct consisting of: instrumental, emotional, appraisal and informational 
(House, 1981). Instrumental support is conceptualized as provision of resources and 
measured by asking whether “officers try to look good to higher ups by assigning extra 
missions or details.” Because this would result in decreased resources available to 
soldiers, it is reverse-coded. Emotional support, which is conceptualized to enhance self 
esteem, is measured by asking whether unit Officers “embarrass soldiers in front of other 
soldiers.” Because this leader behavior would seem to lead to decreased self-esteem, this 
item is also reverse coded. Appraisal support is providing feedback about personal 
functioning directed at enhancing self-esteem. Appraisal support is measured with the 
item asking soldiers whether “unit officers tell soldiers when they have done a good job.” 
Informational support is giving information the receiver can use for coping with 
problems. To measure informational support soldiers were asked whether their “officers 
exhibit clear thinking and reasonable action under stress.” The multidimensional concept 
“leader support” is measured by adding the item scores together. The total possible score 
range is –8 through +8, with higher scores denoting the individual’s perception of greater 
leader support. These items were previously used by WRAIR personnel and have 
acceptable psychometric properties at the individual level with Cronbach’s reliability 
coefficients ranging from .79 to .83 (Jex & Bliese, 1999; Manning  & Fullerton, 1988). 
Unit’s soldier’s scores were aggregated to create the unit level variable. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Level of Unit Post Combat Aggression and Violence (UPCAV) (Appendies D 
through I.)  The dependent variable “aggression and violence” is measured with three 
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questions from the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS2) (Strauss et al., 1996). The most 
frequent application of the CTS2 has been to obtain data on physical assaults on a partner 
(Straus et al., 1996); it is also primarily used to assess participant’s levels of violence 
(Fetsch & Schultz, 2004). Although the CTS2 was designed to measure aggression and 
violence in the family, its list of behaviors is generalizable to other contexts such as the 
workplace and other non-family relationships (Boone & Flint, 1998; Greenberg & 
Barling, 1998). Based on qualitative research conducted during the design of the Conflict 
Tactics Scale (CTS), items are hierarchically ordered from most socially acceptable 
through least socially acceptable (Straus et al., 1996). The CTS2 essentially 
operationalizes the range of conflict related behaviors (Newton, Donaldson-Connelly, & 
Landsverk, 2001). This study focuses on three factors, in order of severity as outlined by 
Straus, et al. (1996): 1) minor psychological aggression, 2) severe psychological 
aggression, and 3) severe physical aggression. Soldiers are asked about their aggressive 
and violent actions during the last month. Soldiers can respond (1) never, (2) once/twice, 
(3) sometimes, (4) often, (5) very often.  
Because intelligent researchers may disagree with a single approach to measuring 
unit post-combat aggression and violence with the available LCS questions, six different 
combinations of three questions from the LCS were used. The first measures minor 
aggression (Appendix D) by asking soldiers to report whether they have angrily “yelled 
or shouted at someone?” Possible scores ranged from 0 through 4. The second measure 
(Appendix D), severe aggression, is measured with the item asking soldiers whether they 
have “threatened someone with violence?” Possible scores range from 0 through 4. The 
third measure (Appendix F) severe assault is measured by asking soldiers how often they 
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“get into a fight with someone and hit the person?” Possible scores ranged from 0 
through 4, with higher scores representing more violent behaviors. The fourth measure 
attempts to combine the above mentioned variables into a single measure (Appendix G), 
by summing the individual variable scores. The fifth measure (Appendix H) combines the 
3 variables, but weights and sums the scores. Weighting is based on the increasing 
intensity and dangerousness of the responses, from minor aggression through severe 
assault.  Finally, the sixth measure (Appendix I) weights the responses the same as the 
fifth measure, but only takes the highest score from the three variables.  
Strauss and colleagues (1996) report estimated internal consistency reliability 
scores as .79 for psychological aggression and .86 for physical assault on the CTS2. At 
the aggregated level, this study’s adapted measures have acceptable psychometric 
properties for nomothetic research with a Cronbach’s standardized alpha reliability 
coefficient from .63 to .68.    
    
Analysis Strategy 
Multiple Regression 
The preferred strategy for analyzing moderating effects is to use multiple 
regression techniques (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Cohen & Willis, 1985). Multiple 
regression is a statistical technique used to analyze the relationship between a single 
dependent variable and multiple independent or predictor variables. This study will use 
multiple regression to account for the variance in an ordinal dependent variable (Unit 
Post Combat Aggression Violence), based on linear combinations of ordinal independent 
variables (Unit Combat Exposure, Unit Leader Support). Multiple regression will be used 
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to test the proposed hypotheses by establishing that a set of independent variables (Unit 
Combat Exposure, Unit Leader Support) explains a proportion of the variance in a 
dependent variable (Unit Post Combat Aggression Violence) at a significant level 
(significance test of the coefficient of determination, R2), and can establish the relative 
predictive importance of the independent variables (comparing beta weights).  
Multiple regression is one of a number of multivariate techniques available to 
researchers and is generally accepted among behavioral science researchers. Multivariate 
techniques are powerful analytical tools. To utilize this power the researcher must first 
examine the data to detect, evaluate and deal with missing data, outliers and influent ial 
cases. Further, because of the complexity of the relationships and the complexity of the 
analyses, it is important to determine whether the data meets the relevant assumptions of 
multiple regressions. The researcher must be aware of any assumption violations and 
their implications for the estimation process or the interpretation of the results (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham & Black,1998). According to Hair, et al. (1998), there are several 
assumptions that the data must meet prior to the use of multiple regression. These 
assumptions include: 1) normality, 2) homoscedasticity, 3) linearity and, 4) absence of 
correlated errors.  
The assumption of normality is fundamental to multiple regression. The normality 
assumption postulates that error, represented by the residuals, should be normally 
distributed for each set of independent values. A histogram of standardized residuals 
should show a roughly normal curve. A more reliable alternative for the same purpose is 
the normal probability plot. The normal probability plot compares the cumulative 
distribution of the actual data to the cumulative distribution of a normal distribution. The 
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normal distribution is represented with a straight 45- degree line. When the actual data 
distribution is normal, the line that represents it will closely follow the diagonal line. If 
the actual data distribution greatly varies from the normal distribution, resulting statistical 
tests are invalid. The central limit theorem assumes that even when error is not normally 
distributed, when sample size is large, the sampling distribution of the beta coefficient 
will still be normal. Therefore violations of this assumption usually have little or no 
impact on substantive conclusions for large samples, but when sample size is small, tests 
of normality are important. 
The next assumption is homoscedasticity, which addresses the dependence 
relationships between variables. It assumes that dependent variables have equal levels of 
variance across the predictor variables. With metric variables, the variance of residual 
error should be constant for all values of the independent(s). When the variances are not 
constant, it causes predictions to be better at some levels of the independent variable than 
at others (Hair et al., 1998). This can result in hypothesis tests being too conservative or 
too sensitive. Additionally, when the homoscedasticity assumption is violated 
"conventionally computed confidence intervals and conventional t-tests for OLS 
estimators can no longer be justified" (Berry, 1993, p.81). Noncons tant error variance can 
indicate the need to respecify the model to include omitted independent variables. Lack 
of homoscedasticity may mean (1) there is an interaction effect between a measured 
independent variable and an unmeasured independent variable not in the model; or (2) 
that some independent variables are skewed while others are not. 
The assumption of linearity is that there is a straight line relationship based on a 
constant unit change (slope) of the dependent variable for a constant unit change of the 
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independent variable. This relationship is based on correlational measures of association. 
Because only linear associations between variables are represented in correlations, 
nonlinear effects are not represented in the correlational value. This can lead to an 
underestimation of the strength of the relationship. That is, R-square will underestimate 
the variance explained overall and the beta coefficients will underestimate the importance 
of the variables involved in the non-linear relationship. To assess for linearity, simple 
regression analysis will be run and residuals will be examined. Any nonlinear portion of 
the relationship will show up in the residuals (Hair et al., 1998). As a general rule, 
nonlinearity is generally not a problem when the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable is more than the standard deviation of the residuals.   
 It is important to ensure that any prediction errors are uncorrelated with each 
other. The assumption of the absence of correlated errors infers that there is no 
unexplained systematic relationship within the dependent variable. If such a relationship 
does exist, then there is no confidence that prediction errors are independent. This would 
mean that there is another factor affecting the results, but it is not included in the model. 
Faulty data collection methods are the most common source of violations of the 
assumption that errors are uncorrelated. To identify correlated errors, researchers must 
identify potential causes. When researchers identify violations, they should attempt to 
identify the previously unidentified factor that is affecting the results and include it in the 
model.  
 Although not considered an assumption, the issue of multicollinearity must also 
be dealt with. Strong correlations between independent variables and the dependent 
variable are desirable. However, multicollinearity or a high correlation between any 
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single independent variable with a set of other independent variables is not desirable. 
Multicollinearity confounds the ability to understand the effects of each individual 
variable. It results in larger portions of shared variance and smaller portions of unique 
variance. Multicollinearity can be identified by examining the correlation matrix for the 
independent variables. The existence of high correlations usually indicates problems with 
multicollinearity. Because it can also be the effect of two or more independent variables, 
it is important to examine the tolerance value, which reports the amount of variability of 
the selected independent variable not explained by other independent variables. There are 
numerous remedy options available.       
  
Proposed Model 
The data meets the two requirements for multiple regression: 1) data is metric (following 
the convention of treating ordinal data as metric) and 2) independent and dependent 
variables have been identified (based on literature review). Standard multiple regression 
is an appropriate technique for analyses of the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables of interest in this study. Standard multiple regression is a way of 
computing OLS regression by entering independent variables (UPD, UCE, ULS and 
uce*uls) into the regression equation at the same time. Simultaneous input of variables 
into the regression is the preferred method when there is no theoretical support for step-
wise entry. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data and the exploratory choice of 
variables, simultaneous entry will be used in this study.  R2 and (r) measure the strength 
of the relationship between the set of independent variables and the dependent variable. 
An F determines whether the relationship can be generalized to the population. T-tests are 
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used to evaluate the individual relationship between each independent variable and the 
dependent variable. Interaction terms will be added to the model to incorporate the joint 
effect of two variables (ex. Unit perceived combat exposure and unit leader support) on 
the dependent variable (Unit post combat aggression and violence) over and above their 
separate effects. Interaction terms will be made into interactional variables, centered 
(Cohen, Cohen, Aiken & West, 2003) (uce x uls) and added to the model as cross 
products, and placed after the centered simple "main effect" independent variables. 
    
Relationship between Proposed Model and Study Hypotheses 
H1: Units with high perceived combat experience (UPDD and UCE) will report more 
post-combat aggression and violence than units with low perceived combat experience. 
This hypothesis will be formally tested by examining the regression coefficients B1 and 
B2 in the following equation:  
AG = B0 + B1(UPDD) + B2(UCE) + e 
H2: Units with high unit leader support (ULS) will report less post-combat aggression 
and violence (AG) than units with low unit leader support. This hypothesis is formally 
tested by examining the regression coefficient B1 in the following equation:  
AG = B0 + B1(ULS) + e 
H3: Unit leader support (ULS) will moderate the relationship between unit combat 
exposure (UCE) and post-combat aggression and violence (AG).  This hypothesis is 
formally tested by examining the regression coefficient B3 in the following equation:  






 This section presents an overview of the characteristics of the study sample, 
characteristics of the study instruments and concludes with the results of the hypotheses 
testing regression procedures described in the last chapter.  
 
Individual Demographic Characteristics 
 The sample consisted of 5435 personnel assigned to the 82nd Airborne (N=3420), 
101st Airborne (N=1312) and 3rd Infantry Divisions (N=703). The average respondent 
was between 20-24 years old (SD = .873). Most respondents described themselves as 
male (98.5%) and white (72.3%). People of Hispanic descent were the next largest group 
of respondents (11.7%) followed by African Americans (8.9 %), other (3.8 %) and 
Asian/Pacific Islander (3.2%).  Junior enlisted soldiers (pay grade E1-E4) represented the 
majority of respondents (60%), followed by non-commissioned officers (pay grade E5-
E9) (33%), officers (6%), and warrant officers (8%). Most respondents had obtained a 
high school diploma (97%), of which 47% had at least some college.  
 
Group Demographic Characteristics 
 The sample consisted of 112 U.S. Army Companys from the 82nd Airborne 
(N=63), 101st Airborne (N=29) and the 3rd Infantry Division (N=20). The average group 
age was 20 to 24 years old. However, two groups had an average age of 18 to19 years old 
range and seven groups had an average age of 25 to 30 years old. The company was 
predominately white (70%) and male (97.9%). Company ethnicity was based on the 
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dichotomous white versus non-white percentage. Groups ranged from 35 percent white to 
100 percent white. Company gender was based on percentage of males in the company. 
Groups ranged from 74 percent male to 100 percent male; 92 percent of all companies 
were entirely male.  For all companies, the mean education level was high school 
diploma. Two of the groups mean level of education was GED and nine other groups had 
a mean education level of some college. 
 During preliminary analysis, demographic variables were considered and 
evaluated for inclusion in the analysis, but were omitted based on the following 
considerations. The primary focus of the study is on the organizational variable unit 
leader support, not the more individually oriented receptivity to unit leader support. 
Because of the aggregation techniques used in the study, it is questionable how helpful 
aggregated demographic data would be in distinguishing the impact of unit combat 
exposure and unit leader support on the level of unit post-combat aggression. In the case 
of age, education, and rank the data further complicates interpretation by its ordinal 
nature. Preliminary analysis found the demographic sub-category “Hispanic” (the 
percentage of unit soldiers who reported being Hispanic) as the only demographic 
variable that consistently remained significant. Interpretations of this finding, that a 
higher percentage of Hispanics had a negative relationship to the level of unit post-
combat aggression and violence, was interesting but difficult to interpret. Are Hispanic 
soldiers more receptive to unit level of leader support, are Hispanic soldiers less violent, 
or is there a special effect of having more Hispanic soldiers in a unit which results in 
reduced post-combat aggression and violence? All of these questions would be better 
answered in a follow up study less prone to committing an ecological fallacy. For these 
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reasons, aggregated individual demographic variables were not used in the following 
regressions.  
 
Results of the Analysis 
 For the purpose of describing the data used to test the hypothesis’s described in 
this study. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the 
analysis of hypothesis’s 1, 2 and 3.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in this Study 




Unit Perceived Danger 1.2852 0.31866 112 
Unit Combat Exposure 7.3784 2.69251 112 
Unit Leader Support 0.4148 1.7794 112 
unit combat exposure X unit leader support  0.4168 3.39956 112 
Minor Aggression 2.0224 0.33819 112 
Severe Aggression 0.8694 0.30973 112 
Severe Assault 0.3394 0.18628 112 
Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) 3.2312 0.72726 112 
Aggression and Violence (Weighted Score) 6.1449 1.73739 112 
Aggression and Violence (Maximum Weighted 
Score 4.0288 0.90392 112 
 
 
Hypothesis 1  
 Hypothesis 1 postulated a positive relationship between level of unit combat 
experience (the combination of level of unit perceived danger and level of unit combat 
exposure) and level of post-aggression and violence. This hypothesis is investigated by 





 Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
to minor aggression at the bivariate level. The variables level of unit perceived danger 
and level of unit combat exposure were included (see Table 2).  The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients calculated for the relationship between predictor variables and minor 
aggression indicated a moderate positive correlation for level of unit perceived danger 
(r=.343, p<.01) and level of unit combat exposure (r=271, p<.01). 
Table 2. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Minor Aggression as 
the Dependent Variable  
 
 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the effects of the 
independent variables on respondent group’s level of post-combat minor aggression. The 
independent variables were level of unit perception of danger and level of unit combat 
exposure. Based on the exploratory nature of the study, variables were entered 
simultaneously as predictors of minor aggression (see Table 3). The overall effect for the 






    Mild Aggression UPD UCE 
Pearson 
Correlation Mild Aggression 1 0.343 0.271 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.343 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.271 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) Mild Aggression   0.001 0.002 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.001   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.002 0.001   
N Mild Aggression 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 
  Unit Combat Exposure 112 112 112 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of Minor 
Aggression as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 1.541 0.131  11.728 0.001 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.417 0.176 0.393 2.372 0.019 
Unit Combat Experience -0.007 0.021 -0.059 -0.356 0.723 
Overall Model: F= 7.359*         
R= .359, R²=.119           
*p<0.01      
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the overall model was a significant predictor of post-combat 
minor aggression. However, only level of unit perceived danger was a significant 
individual predictor (p<.05) of unit level post-combat minor aggression. These findings 
provide support for this study’s first hypothesis that units with high levels of combat 
experience have more post-combat minor aggression.  
 
Severe Aggression  
 Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
with severe aggression at the bivariate level. Both level of unit perceived danger and 
level of unit combat exposure were included (see Table 4).  The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients calculated for the relationship between predictor variables and severe 
aggression indicated a moderate positive correlation for level of unit perceived danger 










Table 4. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Severe Aggression as 
the Dependent Variable 
 
    Severe Aggression UPD UCE 
Pearson 
Correlation Severe Aggression 1 0.288 0.336 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.288 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.336 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) Severe Aggression   0.001 0.001 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.001   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.001 .001   
N Severe Aggression 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 
  Unit Combat Exposure 112 112 112 
 
 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the effects of the 
independent variables on respondent groups’ post-combat severe aggression (see Table 
5). The overall effect for the model was significant (F (8.684) = 10.649, p<.001) with a 
moderate R of .441. 
 
 
Table 5. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of Severe 
Aggression as the Dependent Variable  
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 0.881 0.027  32.793 0.001 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.039 0.01 0.341 3.918 0.001 
Unit Combat Experience -0.037 0.025 -0.14 -1.472 0.144 
Overall Model: F= 8.684*  -0.028 0.009 -0.311 -3.298 0.001 
R=.441, R²=.192           
*p<0.01      
 
As shown in Table 5, the overall model was a significant predictor of post-combat 
severe aggression. However, only level of unit perceived danger was a significant 
individual predictor (p<.01) of unit level post-combat severe aggression. These findings 
provide support for this study’s first hypothesis that units with high levels of combat 





Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
to severe assault at the bivariate level. The variables level of unit perceived danger and 
level of unit combat exposure were included (see Table 6). The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients calculated for the relationship between predictor variables and severe assault 
found a moderate positive correlation with unit perceived danger (r=.245, p<01) and unit 
combat exposure (r=.258, p<.01).  
Table 6. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Severe Assault as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
    Severe Assault UPD UCE 
Pearson 
Correlation Severe Assault 1 0.245 0.258 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.245 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.258 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) Severe Assault   0.005 0.003 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.005   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.003 0.001   
N Severe Assault 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 
  Unit Combat Exposure 112 112 112 
 
A multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict group’s level of severe 
aggression (see Table 7). As shown in Table 7, the overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (4.051) = 3.852, p<0.050) with a moderate R of .263.  
Table 7. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of Severe 
Assault as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 0.176 0.074  2.368 0.02 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.058 0.1 0.099 0.579 0.564 
Unit Combat Experience 0.012 0.012 0.175 1.027 0.307 
Overall Model: F= 4.051*        
R=.263, R²=.060           




As shown in Table 7, the overall model was a significant predictor of post-combat 
severe assault. However, none of the independent variables were significant on their own. 
The significance of the overall model provides support for this study’s first hypothesis 
that units with high levels of combat experience have more post-combat severe assault.  
 
Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
to the non-weighted level of aggression and violence score at the bivariate level. The 
variables level of unit perceived danger and level of unit combat exposure were included 
(see Table 8). The Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated for the relationship 
between predictor variables and aggression and violence found a moderate positive 
correlation with level of unit perceived danger (r=.345, p<01) and level of unit combat 
exposure (r=.335, p<.01). 
Table 8. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Aggression and 
Violence (Non-Weighted Score) as the Dependent Variable 
 




Violence 1 0.345 0.335 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.345 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.335 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Aggression and 
Violence   0.001 0.001 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.001   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.001 0.001   
N 
Aggression and 
Violence 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 




A multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict group’s level of 
aggression and violence (see Table 9). The overall effect for the model was significant (F 
(7.886) = 58.709, p<.001) with a moderate R of .355.  
Table 9. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of Aggression 
and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 2.291 0.281   8.14 0.001 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.494 0.376 0.216 1.311 0.193 
Unit Combat Experience 0.041 0.045 0.154 0.931 0.354 
Overall Model: F=7.886*        
R=.355, R²=.126           
* p<0.01      
 
As shown in Table 9, the overall model was a significant predictor of post-combat 
aggression and violence. However, neither of the independent variables reached 
significance on their own. The significance of the overall model provides support for this 
study’s first hypothesis that units with high levels of combat experience have more post-
combat aggression and aggression (using the non-weighted summed score).  
 
Aggression and Violence (Weighted Score) 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
to the level of aggression and violence (weighted) at the bivariate level. The variables 
level of unit perceived danger and level of unit combat were included (see Table 10). The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated for the relationship between predictor 
variables and aggression and violence found a moderate positive correlation with level of 





Table 10. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Aggression and 
Violence (Weighted Score) as the Dependent Variable 
 




Violence 1 0.329 0.358 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.329 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.358 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Aggression and 
Violence   0.001 0.001 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.001   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.001 0.001   
N 
Aggression and 
Violence 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 
  Unit Combat Exposure 112 112 112 
 
A multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict group’s level of post-
combat aggression and violence (see Table 11). The overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (8.202) = 335.054, p<.001) with a moderate R of .362.  
Table 11. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of 
Aggression and Violence, (Weighted Score) as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 4.147 0.671   6.185 0.001 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.533 0.897 0.098 0.594 0.553 
Unit Combat Experience 0.178 0.106 0.276 1.676 0.097 
Overall Model: F= 8.202*        
R=.362, R²=.131           
* p<0.01      
 
As shown in Table 11, the overall model was a significant predictor of post-
combat aggression and violence. However, neither of the independent variables reached 
significance on their own. The significance of the overall model provides support for this 
study’s first hypothesis that units with high levels of combat experience have more post-





Aggression and Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to determine which variables were related 
to the weighted with maximum score of level of aggression and violence at the bivariate 
level. The variables level of unit perceived danger and level of unit combat exposure 
were included (see Table 12). The Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated for the 
relationship between predictor variables and the level of aggression and violence found a 
moderate positive correlation with the level of unit perceived danger (r=.357, p<01) and 
the level of unit combat exposure (r=.369, p<.01).  
 
Table 12. Pearson Correlations of Predictor Variables and Level of Aggression and 
Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) as Dependent Variable 
 




Violence 1 0.357 0.369 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.357 1 0.84 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.369 0.84 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
Aggression and 
Violence   0.001 0.001 
  Unit Perceived Danger 0.001   0.001 
  Unit Combat Exposure 0.001 0.001   
N 
Aggression and 
Violence 112 112 112 
  Unit Perceived Danger 112 112 112 
  Unit Combat Exposure 112 112 112 
 
A multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict group’s level of 
aggression and violence (see Table 13). The overall effect for the model was significant 











Table 13. Regression Analysis Testing Independent Variables and the Level of 
Aggression and Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) as Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(Constant) 2.864 0.346   8.272 0.001 
Unit Perceived Danger 0.454 0.463 0.16 0.981 0.329 
Unit Combat Experience 0.079 0.055 0.234 1.436 0.154 
Overall Model: F=9.143 *       
R= .379, R²=.144            
* p<0.01      
 
Identical to the other combined measures of post-combat aggression and violence, 
the overall model was a significant predictor of post-combat aggression and violence. 
However, neither of the independent variables reached significance on their own. As with 
the other combined measures, the significance of the overall model provides support for 
this study’s first hypothesis that units with high levels of combat experience (the 
combination of level of unit perception of danger and level of unit combat exposure) have 
more post-combat aggression and violence (using the maximum weighted score). 
 
Hypothesis 2  
 Hypothesis 2 postulates an inverse relationship between level of unit leader 
support and level of unit post-combat aggression and violence. Pearson’s correlations 
were conducted to determine whether level of unit leader support was related to mild 
aggression, severe aggression, severe assault, and all three composite scorings for 
aggression and violence. Level of unit leader support was not significantly related to any 







 Hypothesis 3 primarily focuses on the effect of the interaction variable level of 
unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support. As previously stated, the 
individual variables level of unit combat experience and level of unit leadership were 
centered, per Cohen, et al. (2003), then multiplied to create the interaction variable. 
Because the interaction variable is a construct of two other variables, the correlations for 
the interaction variable are meaningless, and therefore will not be discusses. Additionally, 
because the interaction variable is the primary focus of this hypothesis, neither level of 
combat exposure or level of unit leader support will be discussed in detail.  
 
Mild Aggression 
A multiple regression analysis found a negative association (p<.01) between the 
interaction variable (level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support) and 
post-combat severe aggression (see Table 14). The overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (5.976) = 12.695, p<.001) with a moderate R of .377.  
Table 14. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Minor Aggression as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 2.034 0.03  67.181 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.033 0.011 0.264 2.933 0.004 
unit leader support -0.009 0.028 -0.033 -0.332 0.74 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.027 0.01 -0.274 -2.813 0.006 
Overall Model: F= 5.976*        
R=.377, R²=.142           




 Based on the significance of the interaction, Tate (1998) suggests plotting the 
effect of each independent variable on the outcome variable to demonstrate the 
interaction effect. Figure 3 indicates that as the level of unit combat exposure increases, 
the effect of increased level of unit leader support reduces post-combat mild aggression.  
 
Figure 3. The Effects of Both Level of Unit Combat Exposure and Level of Unit Leader 




Severe Aggression   
 
A multiple regression analysis found a negative association (p<.01) between the 
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post-combat severe aggression (see Table 15). The overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (8.684) = 10.649, p<.001) with a moderate R of .441. 
Table 15. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Severe Aggression as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 0.881 0.027  32.793 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.039 0.01 0.341 3.918 0.001 
unit leader support -0.037 0.025 -0.14 -1.472 0.144 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.028 0.009 -0.311 -3.298 0.001 
Overall Model: F= 8.684*        
R=.441, R²=.194           
*p<0.01      
 
Figure 4 indicates that as the level of unit combat exposure increases, increased 
level of unit leader support reduces post-combat severe aggression. 
Figure 4. The Effects of Both Level of Unit Combat Exposure and Level of Unit Leader 
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Severe Assault  
A multiple regression analysis found a negative association (p<.05) between the 
interaction variable (level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support) and 
post-combat severe assault (see Table 16). The overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (3.047) = 3.852, p<.05) with a moderate R of .279.  
 
Table 16. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Severe Assault as the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 0.342 0.017  19.782 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.018 0.006 0.263 2.819 0.006 
unit leader support -0.012 0.016 -0.076 -0.747 0.457 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.006 0.006 -0.114 -1.126 0.263 
Overall Model: F= 3.047*       
R=.279, R²=.078            
*p<0.05.       
 
 
Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) 
A multiple regression analysis found a negative association (p<.01) between the 
interaction variable (level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support) and 
post-combat severe assault (see Table 17). The overall effect for the model was 
significant (F (8.056) = 58.709, p<.001) with a moderate R of .428. The interaction 
variable level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support was also 
significant (p<.01), which indicates that as combat exposure increases, higher levels of 
unit leader support are associated with lover levels of post-combat aggression and 






Table 17. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 3.257 0.064  51.254 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.091 0.024 0.335 3.821 0.001 
unit leader support -0.058 0.059 -0.094 -0.984 0.327 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.062 0.02 -0.289 -3.041 0.003 
Overall Model: F= 8.055*        
R=.428, R²=.183           
*p<0.01      
 
Figure 5. The Effects of Both Level of Unit Combat Exposure and Level of Unit Leader 
Support on Post-Combat Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score) 
Aggression and Violence (Weighted Score) 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the effect of the 
interaction variable level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support on 
respondent group’s level of post-combat aggression and violence (see Table 18). The 
overall effect for the model was significant (F (7.658) = 335.054, p<.001) with a 
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unit leader support was also significant (p<.01). This indicates that as combat exposure 
increases, higher levels of unit leader support are associated with lower levels of combat 
aggression and violence, as depicted in Figure 6. 
Table 18. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Aggression and Violence (Weighted Score) as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 6.195 0.152  40.627 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.231 0.057 0.358 4.061 0.001 
unit leader support -0.116 0.142 -0.078 -0.815 0.417 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.121 0.049 -0.237 -2.484 0.015 
Overall Model: F= 7.658*        
R=.419, R²=.175           
*p<0.01      
 
Figure 6. The Effects of Both Level of Unit Combat Exposure and Level of Unit Leader 
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Aggression and Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the effect of the 
interaction variable level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader support on 
respondent group’s level of post-combat aggression and violence (see Table 19). The 
overall effect for the model was significant (F (9.178) = 90.695, p<.001) with a moderate 
R of.451. The interaction variable level of unit combat exposure and level of unit leader 
support was also a significant (p<.01). This indicates that as combat exposure increases, 
higher levels of unit leader support are associated with lower levels post-combat 
aggression and violence, as depicted in Figure 7. 
Table 19. Regression Analysis Testing Interaction Variable (unit combat exposure x unit 
leader support) and the Level of Aggression and Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) as 
the Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor Variable B S.E. B Beta t sig. 
(constant) 4.059 0.078  52.042 0.001 
unit combat exposure 0.122 0.029 0.365 4.208 0.001 
unit leader support -0.044 0.073 -0.057 -0.602 0.549 
unit combat exposure X unit leader 
support -0.074 0.025 -0.277 -2.947 0.004 
Overall Model: F= 9.178*        
R=.451, R²=.203           
















Figure 7. The Effects of Both Level of Unit Combat Exposure and Level of Unit Leader 
Support on Post-Combat Aggression and Violence Aggression and Violence Aggression 
and Violence (Maximum Weighted Score) 
 
 
Summary of Results 
 This study examined 112 US Army companies assigned to one of three active 
duty combat infantry divisions. Multiple regression analyses were used to determine the 
extent to which group level variables (unit perception of danger, unit combat exposure, 
unit leader support and the interaction of unit combat exposure and unit leader support) 
predicted the level of post-combat aggression and violence.  
The results of the multiple regressions supported the first hypothesis that higher 
levels of unit combat experience (as tested by the overall model of level of unit 
perception of danger and level of unit combat exposure) were associated with increased 
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combined measures of aggression and violence. The null hypothesis was rejected and 
Hypothesis 1 was supported.  
The second hypothesis, that the main effect of the level of unit leader support 
would be negatively associated with level of unit post-combat aggression and violence, 
was not supported. However, the third hypothesis was supported. The level of unit leader 
support was found to buffer the level of unit combat exposure and reduce post-combat 
minor aggression, severe aggression, and all of the combined measures of aggression and 
violence.  In each of the above mentioned measures, as the level of unit combat exposure 
increased, the increased levels of unit leader support resulted in less post-combat 
aggression and violence. Only in the case of severe assault was the interaction variable 
non-significant.  
Although support for weighting the aggression and violence measures could not 
be found in the literature, all three techniques for combining the measures of post- 
aggression and violence (non-weighted score, weighted score, and maximum weighted 












DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion 
 The conceptual model for this study is based on the theoretical constructs of 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional stress theory, Bliese and Castro’s (2003) 
Soldier Adaptation Model and Cobbs (1976) conception of the effects of social support. 
Basically, stressors and the perception of those stressors can be moderated by 
organizational factors such as leader support. Thus, three hypotheses were tested in this 
study to establish support for the theoretical constructs of the conceptual model. The first 
hypothesis was concerned with the effect of unit combat experience on unit post-combat 
aggression and violence. The second hypothesis sought to examine the extent to which 
unit leader support had a main effect on the relationship between unit combat experience 
and unit post-combat aggression and violence. The final hypothesis examined the extent 
to which unit leader support had a buffering effect on the relationship between unit 
combat exposure and unit post-combat aggression and violence. For the sake of lucidity, 
the discussion will begin with the most unexpected findings. 
 
The Buffering Effect of Unit Leader Support with Unit Combat Experience on 
Aggression and Violence 
 This study investigated whether the organizational variable, level of unit leader 
support, moderated or buffered units from the potentially negative effects of unit combat 
experience. Evidence for this supposition derives from the demonstration of a statistical 
effect of stress X support, represented by a statistical interaction in which those who 
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receive more social support have a weaker positive stressor strain relationship. This 
potentially demonstrates that unit leader support weakens the relationship between 
stressors and strains. Another way of conceptualizing the buffering effect of leader 
support is that the effect is conditional on the presence of a stressor, in this case combat 
exposure. Therefore, this study’s conceptual model hypothesized that units with high 
levels of unit leader support and combat exposure would report less post-combat 
aggression and violence. The findings of the current study support this position by 
demonstrating a significant negative relationship between the levels of leader support, 
combat exposure and all the measures of post-combat aggression and violence except 
severe assault.    
The results of the current study offer further support to the existing literature 
correlating the buffering effect of leader support on the relationship between stressors and 
strains, or in this case combat exposure and post-combat aggression and violence. The 
results of previous investigations of the buffering effect of leader support on soldiers 
found it significantly related to decreased hostility (Bliese & Halverson, 2002), 
psychological strain (Bliese & Castro, 2000), and Combat Stress Reactions (Solomon et 
al., 1986). This study’s finding that the interaction of unit leader support and combat 
exposure accounted for between 5 percent and 8 percent of the variance is similar in 
magnitude to civilian occupational stress studies that investigated the buffering effects of 
organizational support on violence in the workplace (Leather et al., 1998; Schat & 
Kelloway, 2003).  
This study’s findings on the buffering effect of leader support versus the direct 
effect of leader support may seem to contradict each other. This is not necessarily so. A 
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quick review of the theoretical differences between the buffering effect and the main 
effect of support may help distinguish this occurrence. The main effect of support posits 
that in all environments (regardless of the presence of stressors), leader support would 
result in reduced strain. The buffering effect theorizes that only in an environment where 
stressors are present does leader support effectively reduce strain. Pertaining to the main 
effect, this study found that increased unit leader support was not a significant predictor 
of higher aggression and violence. Specific to the buffering effect, this study found that 
the more unit combat was experienced with higher levels of unit leader support, 
aggression and violence decreased (consistent with the hypothesis). So leader support 
alone does not have an effect on post-combat aggression and violence, but leader support 
in the presence of combat decreases post-combat aggression and violence. (The 
correlational nature of this study precludes more conclusive casual inferences.) The 
possible reasons for this have been previously discussed; suffice it to point out the 
findings are not necessarily opposed as they result from different situations. 
 
The Main Effect of Unit Leader Support on Aggression and Violence 
 This study investigated whether the organizational variable unit leader support 
provided a beneficial effect irrespective of whether a unit is under stress or not. It was 
hypothesized that higher levels of unit leader support would predict lower levels of post-
combat aggression and violence. The level of unit leader support as a direct effect was 
not significant in predicting levels of post-combat aggression and violence. 
 This finding is incongruent with the general findings of studies on the direct effect 
of social support (e.g. Beehr, 1995; Cohen & Willis, 1985; Viswesvaran et al., 1999). 
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Those studies generally found a weak but negative relationship between social support 
and psychological strain. Data coding was rechecked and the findings of this study re-
verified. The following discussion will intertwine reviews of published military leader 
support studies with this study’s methodology in an attempt to better understand the lack 
of supportive findings in the current study.  
 Bliese and Halverson (2002) conducted a methodologically similar (purposive 
sampling strategy based on soldier availability, large active duty sample, survey research, 
similar measure of leader support, variables measured at the group level), study which 
examined the main effect of group perception of leader support on unit hostility. They 
evaluated data from 49 US Army companies deployed on the non-combat operation 
Uphold Democracy to Haiti in 1994. They found evidence for the main effect of leader 
support. Units that perceived their leaders to be supportive had lower levels of hostility 
than units which perceived their leaders as less supportive (mean square= .81, F=5.33, 
p<.05). Bliese and Halverson’s choice to measure psychological strain as an outcome 
variable for leader support is in keeping with published social support literature (e.g., 
Beehr, 1995; Bliese & Castro, 2000; Cohen & Willis, 1985; Solomon, Mikulincer & 
Hobfoll, 1986; Viswesvaran et al., 1999). This study’s outcome variable, a behavioral 
strain, has not been previously investigated. The difference between outcome variables, 
psychological strain (supported in the literature) versus behavioral strain (not identified in 
the literature) may provide some explanatory support for the difference in findings 
between this study and those found in the literature.  
  Another example of a similar methodological study (purposive sampling strategy 
based on soldier availability, large active duty sample, survey research, similar measure 
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of leader support, variables measured at the group level) which found leader support to 
decrease psychological strain was Bliese and Castro’s (2000) study of soldiers preparing 
to go on a training exercise. They found NCO support was negatively related to 
psychological strain. Specifically, army companies with high NCO support had, on 
average, lower levels of psychological strain than did companies with low NCO support 
(beta=.054, p< .01). Similar to Bliese and Halverson’s (2003) study, Bliese and Castro 
used psychological strain as an outcome measure. The earlier discussion pertaining to the 
choice of psychological strain versus behavioral strain is equally cogent, but will not be 
restated. The main difference between Bliese and Castro’s (2000) study and this study is 
the level of leadership investigated. NCOs act as soldier’s direct supervisors, and 
therefore control much of soldier’s day to day activities. The point of this comparison is 
to point out that Bliese and Castro’s (2000) study and this study, though seemingly 
similar (investigating the effect of leader support at the unit level) are quite different in 
important aspects that may have contributed to  different outcomes.  
 Solomon, Mikulincer and Hobfoll (1986) also found support for the main effect of 
leader support. Their study carefully matched 382 Israeli soldiers who developed Combat 
Stress Reactions (CSR) in the Lebanon War, with 334 Israeli soldiers who had 
participated in the same frontline combat units but did not develop CSR. Battle intensity 
was assessed by asking soldiers how threatening they perceived their battle experiences 
were. Perception of leadership support was measured using an adapted version of the 
Military Company Environment Inventory (Moos, 1973) and like the current study 
focused on officer support. Their study found that there was a significant difference 
between groups. Soldiers who suffered from CSR reported that their officers were less 
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supportive both emotionally and instrumentally than soldiers not suffering from CSR. 
The Solomon, et al. study was methodologically strong and differs in important 
conceptual ways from the current study. First, their study used individuals as the unit of 
analysis. Their strategy focuses on the individual’s perception of leader support versus 
the current study’s strategy of using the group as the unit of analysis. The current study 
assumes that the group average score is mathematically a better measure of the actual 
leader support in the group, versus any individual score. This is an important distinction, 
especially considering the Solomon, et al. focus on CSR soldiers versus non-CSR 
soldiers. The reasoning for this argument is that soldiers who have CSR may be more 
prone to blame lack of leader support as being partially responsible for their CSR. If this 
is the case for at least some CSR soldiers, then the Solomon, et al. findings speak more to 
the perceptions of CSR and non-CSR soldiers and not about the role of leader support in 
the development of CSR.  
 Comparing the current study to published studies with positive findings does not 
tell the whole story. It is important to clarify limitations inherent in this study.  The data 
were collected from subjects at one time point. Because the data are cross sectional and 
correlational in nature, the causality of the examined relationships is suspect. Cross-
sectional studies are inherently vulnerable to threats to internal validity. Plausible 
alternative explanations for the relationships observed can not be ruled out because there 
is no matched control group. 
As discussed above, there are numerous methodological differences which may 
explain the difference in findings. The above studies evaluate the effect of the level of 
leader support on psychological strain. Behavioral strain or aggression and violence may 
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be better conceptualized as behaviors than psychological outcome and therefore better 
regulated than attitudinal outcomes. 
This study’s finding that the main effect of leader support is not a significant 
predictor of post-combat aggression and violence should not be seen as implying that  in 
the absence of combat leader support is not important. For example, it would be short 
sighted to suggest that leaders should only be supportive during combat. The bigger 
picture appears to be that leader support is especially important during times of increased 
stressors.  
 
Unit Combat Experience and Aggression and Violence 
 An additional finding that merits discussion is that the level of combat experience 
was a significant predictor of the level of post-combat aggression and violence. Derived 
from the theoretical premise of the Lazarus and Folkman (1984) transactional model of 
stress, this study’s conceptual model posited that both stressors and perception of 
stressors are critical in determining an individual’s stress response. This study sought to 
test this at the group level by including the group’s mean rating of both combat exposure 
and perception of danger. It was thus hypothesized that groups that report increased 
levels of combat exposure and increased perception of danger would report increased 
levels of post-combat aggression and violence. The results of the current study provide 
support for combat exposure and perceived danger as significant predictors for post-
combat aggression and violence.  
 In this study, the individual predictor variable level of unit combat exposure was 
not a significant predictor of the level of minor aggression, severe aggression, severe 
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assault or any of the combined aggression and violence measures. This finding is contrary 
to Beckham, Feldman and Kirby’s (1998) results, which found combat exposure as 
significantly related to interpersonal violence in 151 help-seeking Vietnam combat 
veterans (beta=.05, p<.05). Numerous methodological differences exist. Beckham, et al. 
(1998) relied on 20 year post-combat, unsubstantiated self reporting of combat exposure 
from help-seeking respondents.  Additionally, Beckham, et al. (1998) used the Combat 
Exposure Scale (Keene et al., 1988) and a modified version of the Conflict Tactics Scale 
(CTS) (Strauss et al., 1996), both differing from the measures used in this study. It must 
also be pointed out that Beckham and colleagues investigated the effect of combat 
exposure on individuals, as opposed to its effect on groups.      
 Prigerson, Maciejewski and Rosenheck (2002) also found that combat exposure 
contributed significantly to current spouse or partner abuse (beta=.012, p<.05). Their 
study was derived from the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), which included 179 
respondents who reported that they had been exposed to combat. The Prigerson, et al.  
(2002) study also differs from this study in important ways that may account for opposing 
findings. First, their combat exposure measure was dichotomous, in that it only asked 
whether subjects had participated in combat or not. There is no ability to ascertain the 
level of combat exposure. Second, their study focused specifically on spouse and partner 
abuse, instead of the more global outcome of aggression and violence. Finally, their study 
looked at the individual level and did not factor in any organizational level variables.  
As opposed to the level of combat exposure, the current study found that unit 
level perception of danger significantly predicted minor and severe aggression. This 
seems to lend credence to Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) notion that the individual’s 
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perception of the stressor is the primary factor in the stressor-strain relationship. These 
findings seem to concur with Solomon, Mikulincer and Hobfoll (1987), who measured 
the contribution of objective and perceived measures of combat experience to Combat 
Stress Reactions (CSR) in Israeli combat veterans of the Lebanon War. They found that 
although objective measures of combat exposure were significant (accounting for 1.8% of 
variance), perceived danger was the most important factor discriminating between CSR 
and non-CSR soldiers (6.2 % of the variance explained). It is important to note the 
differences in the two studies; Solomon and colleagues focused on the individual level as 
opposed to the group level. Even so, both studies provide at least cursory support for 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) conceptualization of the importance of perception in the 
stressor-strain relationship.       
 
Implications for Theory 
 The conceptual model for this study is based on the theoretical constructs of 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional stress theory. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) 
specifically defined stress as “a relationship between the person and the environment that 
is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his 
or her well-being” (p. 21). The findings of this study provide partial support for the 
theory’s position that appraisal plays the major role in stress. This study found that a 
unit’s level of perception of danger is a significant predictor of the level of post-combat 
minor and severe aggression, whereas a unit’s reported level of combat exposure was not. 
However, in subsequent analysis of the levels of severe assault and combined measures 
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of aggression and violence neither the levels of unit perception of danger nor unit combat 
exposure significantly predicted the strain of post-combat aggression and violence.  
 The main effect of the level of unit leader support was not a significant predictor 
of any of the measures of post-aggression and violence. However, the interaction between 
unit leader support and unit combat exposure, the buffering effect, was found to be a 
significant predictor of decreased levels of post-combat aggression and violence (but not 
severe assault when measured alone). This finding also supports Bliese and Castro’s 
(2003) conceptualization of organizational factors as moderators of the stress-strain 
relationship.   
Cobb (1976) theorized that social support has a main or direct effect on strain 
such that when support is evident, strain will be reduced regardless of the amount of 
stressors present. This study found evidence that the level of unit leader support did not 
have a direct effect on the level of post-combat aggression and violence. Studies that 
examined the main effect of leader support used psychological outcome measures as 
opposed to the behavioral outcome measures used in this study. Further research is 
necessary to increase the understanding of this outcome. This is a potentially important 
area for future social support theory development. 
This study did provide support for the buffering effect of leader support. As the 
only study which investigated the moderating effect of the level of unit leader support on 
the levels of combat exposure and post-combat aggression and violence, these findings 
offer support for the theory. Demonstrating that leader support in combination with 
combat exposure can decrease the behavioral strain of post-combat aggression and 




Implications for Practice 
 Since the beginning of combat operations initiated post 11 September 2002, the 
Army has deployed about half of its active duty soldiers as well as large numbers from 
the Army Reserve and National Guard. During combat operations Social Work Officers 
continue to apply core clinical social work skills drawn from the historic person- in-
environment perspective in providing primary and secondary preventive services (Martin 
& Campbell, 1999). 
 The findings from this study increase the knowledge base of the effects of 
participation in combat on post-combat aggression and violence. Whereas combat has 
been widely assumed to result in post-combat aggression and violence, this study has 
revealed that the relationship between combat and post-combat aggression and violence 
may be affected by organizational factors such as leader support. This finding has 
important implications for practice in a number of ways.  
 Severe assault may be the component of violence of most interest to leaders and 
social workers dealing with post-combat violence. The finding that unit level “severe 
assault” was not significantly related to either the direct effect of leader support or the 
buffering effect of leader support suggests that severe assault may not result from the 
organizational factors studied. It appears that the factors that contribute to soldiers’ level 
of post-combat severe aggression perhaps lie elsewhere. Those interested in preventing 
soldier post-combat violence (such as social workers, law enforcement and leaders) may 
need to focus on individual factors that contribute to violence. Even though unit leaders 
may not be responsible for contributing to soldiers’ severe assault through their 
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supportive leadership style, unit leaders are still responsible to identify soldiers with 
anger management issues and ensure that these soldiers receive available prevention 
treatment. In keeping with Army regulations, leaders should use a command referral for 
these soldiers. Command referrals are used to ensure that identified soldiers receive a 
mental health assessment. The Army routinely offers individual counseling, anger 
management and psycho-educational counseling.  
Like severe assault, mild and severe aggression can also be harmful. In this study 
both mild and severe aggression were related to the buffering effect of the level of unit 
leader support. When screening soldiers for aggression, social workers should attempt to 
ascertain information concerning the unit’s leader support for indications of potential unit 
aggression post-combat.  
The finding that the level of unit leader support buffers combat exposure, 
resulting in reduced levels of post-combat aggression and violence, may be the most 
important finding related to practice. Unit leaders need to be informed that with increased 
combat exposure, their supportive leadership is particularly essential in reducing the level 
of post-combat aggression and violence. Based on this finding, social workers should 
gather information on the amount of combat a unit has participated in and the level of 
leader support when attempting to prevent or decrease a unit’s post-combat aggression 
and violence. Units that participate in combat, but have low leader support may be a 
higher priority for post-combat aggression and violence interventions.  
All of the above practice implications highlight the importance of social workers 
being aware of a unit’s leadership climate and combat experience. This emphasizes the 
importance of the social worker’s role of consultant to commanders. The Army defines 
 
 94 
consultation as liaison, prevention advice, education programs, planning and stress 
control interventions to supported unit commanders and staff. An effective consultation 
relationship with commanders is based on the social worker’s proximity and availability. 
Social workers should encourage leaders to be vigilant and proactive about command 
referrals for soldiers with anger management issues.    
 
Implications for Policy 
 This study provides support for the US Army’s command policy that unit leaders 
must do two things: 1) accomplish the mission; and 2) take care of soldiers (US Army, 
2004). This study has focused on the taking care of soldiers through supportive 
leadership, especially during combat. Sold iers with supportive leadership during combat 
have lower levels of aggression and violence upon return from combat. It can be deduced 
that these units might be more capable of accomplishing their mission upon return 
because they might be less aggressive and violent at home station.   
This study also informs the leader training; primarily it demonstrates that there is 
a relationship between leader support and post-combat aggression and violence. It is the 
first to demonstrate such a relationship. Based on this evidence training should continue 
to emphasis the importance of leader support, especially in combat.   
 The technique used in this study, aggregating variables to the unit level, supports 
group level measurements of organizational factors. The influence of individual 
perspective can not be ruled out, but having significant findings for group level 
organizational factors demonstrates that important relationships between organizational 
factors and organizational behaviors. This provides initial support for using group level 
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measurements in both assessing specific contextual factors and their effects. This study 
also demonstrates the importance of identifying and understanding a unit’s leadership 
climate. This information can best be gathered at the unit level. The Army currently has 
an instrument to assess a unit’s command climate, titled the Command Climate Survey. 
The instrument is designed as a self-contained stand-alone tool for the commander to 
assess the climate in their unit focusing on leadership, leader accessibility, leader concern 
for families, and leader concern for soldiers. The Command Climate Survey is currently 
strictly used at the discretion of unit commanders for their own purposes. The need to 
understand a unit’s climate may warrant either the incorporation of the command climate 
survey or the development of a similar instrument that social workers can use to assess 
unit organizational factors. This could potentially provide information from which Army 
social workers and other mental health practioners can base interventions designed to 
decrease post-combat aggression and violence.      
 
Implications for Further Research 
 This study should be considered a first step in future research of the impact of 
combat experience and leadership support on group level post-combat aggression and 
violence. Future research would benefit from rigorous scientific methods including the 
use of a probability sampling method. Units that are identified for deployment to combat 
operations could be randomly selected from all the units known to be going to combat. 
This would decrease the risk of selection bias inherent in the current study. Additionally, 
identification of comparison groups that have a low probability of combat deployment 
could be used to compare findings. With the high rate of unit deployment to combat 
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operations currently under way, this could potentially be problematic, but would still 
increase confidence in findings.  
Future studies should be prospective and longitudinal. Gathering data prior to 
deployment in an attempt to gather baseline data on the dependent variable would 
increase confidence in any finding produced. Rubin and Babbie (2001) point out that 
longitudinal studies are valuable in assessing whether a specific attribute increases the 
risk of developing later problems. A longitudinal study of groups with data collections at 
pre-combat deployment, during combat deployment, and three month post-combat 
deployment may be ideal.  
Future studies would also benefit from using more robust measures of the 
independent and dependent variables. Aggression and violence would be better measured 
by including the whole Conflict Tactics Scale (Murray et al., 1996). Research literature 
contains numerous factor analysis validity studies and test re-test findings of the whole 
CTS. Additionally, a broader measure of leader support, similar to the Command Climate 
Survey, may increase the content validity of findings related to the construct of leader 
support.   
Another example of strengthening the measurement of variables in future research 
is using additional external measures. Future studies should collect aggression and 
violence prevalence data from leaders and law enforcement officials about reported 
incidents by soldiers within the selected units. By triangula ting respondent’s survey 
responses to reports of actual incidents, concurrent criterion validity could be assessed. 
Leader support is another variable on which further data collection would be beneficial. 
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Data could also be collected from the unit leader’s superiors and staff. This would 
provide a measure to assess inter-rater reliability.  
Future research needs to examine other organizational issues, such as the effect of 
Non-Commissioned Officer support and or peer support. Non-Commissioned Officers 
and peers have more direct contact with soldiers than officers. Similarly, unit cohesion, 
unit esprit de corps, unit casualty rates, unit leadership style, unit leadership justice, unit 
morale are all areas that may contribute to a better understanding of organizational 
factors effects on post-combat aggression and violence.   
When feasible, future studies should use the advanced statistical analysis 
strategies incorporating multi- level modeling. Multi- level models, referred to as random 
coefficient models or hierarchical linear models (HLM), provide the flexibility and 
analytical properties to analyze complex data structures incorporating data at both the 
individual level and unit (group) level. HLM corrects the problem of underestimated 
standard errors by permitting the analyst to incorporate unique random effects for each 
unit. Hoffman (1997) posits that HLM models take into account both the individual’s and 
group’s residual error, while recognizing the partial interdependence of individuals 
within their particular group. HLM allows the analyst to simultaneously examine 
relationships by using two models: one models relationships within each unit, and a 
second models how the relationships within each unit vary between units (Hoffman, 
1997, Bryk & Raudenbush, 2002). It would appear that a multi- level model analysis 
would be the next logical step in reanalyzing the data used in this study to see whether 







 The United States government’s response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 
2001 has resulted in two wars. Not since the Viet Nam War have so many US Army 
soldiers participated in combat operations. Based on the assumption that these wars will 
not be concluded in the near future, there is a strong likelihood that increasing numbers of 
soldiers, marines, seamen and airmen will participate in the dangerous environment of 
combat. Understanding the deleterious effects of combat and factors which decrease the 
likelihood that combat veterans will return from combat aggressive and violent should be 
a priority of the military researchers and mental health practitioners.  
 Military social workers, specifically Army social work officers for the past 50 
years, have provided services developed to assist combat veterans in their transition to the 
home front. Their mandate is clear, provide services that strengthen and enhance the well 
being of soldiers and families. This is particularly important while our nation is at war. 
Despite the limitations previously described, this study provides evidence that leader 
support might affect soldiers’ aggression and violence. Social workers should use this 
information to provide leader consultation emphasizing the potential impact of leaders on 






























How often did you experience the 













Receiving small arms fire 0 1 2 3 4 
Shooting or directing fire at the enemy 0 1 2 3 4 
Calling in fire on the enemy 0 1 2 3 4 
Engaging in hand-to-hand combat 0 1 2 3 4 
Being wounded/injured 0 1 2 3 4 
Receiving incoming artillery, rocket or mortar 
fire 0 1 2 3 4 
Being directly responsible for the death of an 
enemy combatant 0 1 2 3 4 
Having a member of your own unit become a 
casualty 0 1 2 3 4 
Had a buddy who was shot or hit near you   1 2 3 4 
Had close call, dud, hit in protective gear, 
equipment shot off 0 1 2 3 4 
Improvised explosive device (IED)/booby 





Unit Perceived Danger (UPD)  
 
During the most recent 
deployment, how often were 
you in danger of being 




















































































Thinking about your unit, rate how 








Tell soldiers when they have done a good 
job? 0 1 2 3 4 
Embarrass soldiers in front of other 
soldiers? 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
Try to look good to higher-ups by 
assigning extra missions or details to 
soldiers? 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
Exhibit clear thinking and reasonable 
action under stress. 0 1 2 3 4 





Unit Post-Combat Minor Aggression   
 

















































Unit Post-Combat Severe Aggression   
 








Threaten someone with physical 










































Unit Post-Combat Severe Assault   
 







Get into a fight with someone and hit the 










































Unit Post-Combat Aggression and Violence (Non-Weighted Score)   
 
 







Get angry at someone and yell or shout at them? 0 1 2 3 4 
Threaten someone with physical violence? 0 1 2 3 4 
Get into a fight with someone and hit the 








































Unit Post-Combat Aggression and Violence (Weighted Score)   
 
 







Get angry at someone and yell or shout at them? 0 1 2 3 4 
Threaten someone with physical violence? 0 5 6 7 8 
Get into a fight with someone and hit the 


















































Get angry at someone and yell or shout at them? 0 1 2 3 4 
Threaten someone with physical violence? 0 5 6 7 8 
Get into a fight with someone and hit the 






















Adler, N., & Matthews, K. A. (1994). Health and psychology: why do some people get 
sick and some people get well? Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 229-259. 
Aldwin, C. M. (n.d.). Coping with traumatic stress. PTSD Research Quarterly, 4(3), 1-3. 
Attachment as an organizational framework for research on close relationships. (1994). 
Psychological Inquiry, 5(1), 1-22. 
Balgopal, P. R. (1989, September). Occupational social work: An expanded clinical 
perspective. Social Work, 437-442. 
Barak, M. E., & Bargal, D. (2000). Human services in the context of work: Evolving and 
innovative roles for occupational social work. Administration in Social Work, 
23(3-4), 1-11. 
Barling, J. (1996). The prediction, experience, and consequences of workplace violence. 
In G. R. VandenBos & E. Q. Bulatao (Eds.), Violence on the job (pp. 215-235). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Barling, J., MacEwen, K. E., & Pratt, L. I. (1988, April). Manipulating the type and 
source of social support: An experimental investigation. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioral Science, 20(2), 140-153. 
Beckham, J., Feldman, M., Kirby, A., Hertzberg, M., & Moore, S. (1997). Interpersonal 
violence and its correlates in Vietnam veterans with chronic post-traumatic 
disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 53(8), 859-869. 
Beehr, T. (1995). Psychological stress in the workplace. London: Routledge. 
 
 109 
Beehr, T. A., Farmer, S. J., & Glazer, S. (2003, July). The enigma of social support and 
occupational stress: Source congruence and gender roles.  Journal of 
Occupational Health Psychology, 8 (3), 220-231. 
Bliese, P. D., & Britt, T. W. (2001). Social support, group consensus and stressor-strain 
relationships: Social context matters. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 
425-436. 
Bliese, P. D., & Castro, C. A. (2003). Soldier Adaptation Model: Applications to 
peacekeeping research. In T. W. Britt, A. B. Adler, & C. T. Westport (Eds.), The 
Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the field (pp. 185-203). Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers. 
Bliese, P. D., & Halverson, R. R. (1996). Individual and nomothetic models of job stress: 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26, 1171-1189. 
Bliese, P. D., & Halverson, R. R. (2002, February). Using random group resampling in 
multi- level research: An example of the buffering effects of leadership climate. 
Leadership Quarterly, 13(1), 53-68. 
Bliese, P. D., Halverson, R. R., & Schriesheim, C. A. (2002, February). Benchmarking 
multi- level methods in leadership: The articles, the model and the data set. 
Leadership Quarterly, 13(1), 3-14. 
Boone, S., & Flint, C. (1988). A psychometric analysis of aggression and conflict 
resolution behavior in black adolescent males. Social Behavior and Personality, 
16(2), 215-226. 




Brief, A. P., & George, J. M. (1991). Psychological stress and the workplace: A brief. 
Journal of Social Behavior & Personality, 6(7), 15-20. 
Britt, T. W., Davison, J., & Bliese, P. D. (2004, July). How leaders can influence the 
impact that stressors have on soldiers. Military Medicine, 169(7), 541-545. 
Brown, G. W., & Harris, T. (1978). Social Origins of Depression: A study of psychiatric 
disorders in women. New York: Free Press. 
Cammann, C., Fichman, M., Jenkins, G. D., & Klesh, J. (1983). Michigan organizational 
assessment questionnaire. In S. E. Seashore, E. E. Lawler, P. H. Mirvis, & C. 
Camman (Eds.), Assessing Organizational Change: A Guide to Methods, 
Measures, and Practices (pp. 71-138). New York: Wiley-Interscience. 
Cannon, W. (1935). Stresses and strain of homeostasis. American Journal of Medical 
Science, 189(1), 1-14. 
Caplan, G. (1975). Support Systems and Community Mental Health. New York: 
Behavioral Publications. 
Castro, C., & Cox, T. (2003, March). Introduction to the WRAIR Land Combat Study. 
Paper presented at 48th Brigade Combat Team Meeting, Fort Stewart, GA. 
Champoux, J., & Peters, W. S. (1987). Form effect size and power in moderated 
regression analysis. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 60(3), 243-255. 
Cobb, S. (1976). Social support as a moderator of life stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 
38(5), 300-312. 
Cohen, S., Evans, G. W., Stokols, D., & Krantz, D. S. (1986). Behavior, Health, and 
Environmental Stress. . New York: Plenum Press. 
 
 111 
Cohen, S., & McCay, G. (1984). Interpersonal relationships as buffers of the impact of 
psychological stress on health. In A. Baum, J. E. Singer, & S. E. Taylor (Eds.), 
Handbook of Psychology and Health (pp. 253-280). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Cohen, S., & Syme, S. L. (1985). Social support and health. San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press. 
Cohen, S., & Williamson, S. M. (1991). Stress and infectious disease in humans. 
Psychological Bulletin, 109, 5-24. 
Cohen, S., & Wills, T. (1985). Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 98, 310-357. 
Combat Stress Control in a Theater of Operations. (1994). Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office. 
Cooper, C. L., & Bramwell, R. S. (1992). A comparative analysis of occupational stress 
in managerial and shop floor workers in the brewing industry: Mental health, job 
satisfaction, and sickness. Work and Stress, 6, 127-138. 
Cooper, C. L., Dewe, P. J., & O’Driscoll, M. P. (2001). Organizational stress: A review 
and critique of theory, research and applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Cooper, C. L., Dewe, P. J., & O’Driscoll, M. P. (2003, Spring). Organizational stress: A 
review and critique of theory, research and applications. Personnel Psychology, 
56(1), 271-273. 
Cox, T. (1997). Workplace health promotion. Work and Stress, 11, 1-5. 
Crandall, R., & Perrewe, P. L. (Eds.). (1995). Occupational stress: A handbook. 
Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis. 
 
 112 
Derogatis, L. R., & Melisaratos, N. (1983, August). The brief symptom inventory: An 
introductory report. Psychological Medicine, 13(3), 595-605. 
Dohrenwend, B. P., & Shrout, P. E. (1985, July). Hassles in the conceptualization and 
measurement of life stress variables. American Psychologist, 40(7), 780-785. 
Dohrenwend, B. S., Dohrenwend, B. P., Dodson, M., & Shrout, P. E. (1984). Symptoms, 
hassles, social supports and life events: Problem of confounded measures. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 93(2), 222-230. 
Donovan, R. (1987, May). Stress in the workplace: A framework for research and 
practice. Social Casework: The Journal of Contemporary Social Work, 259-266. 
Edwards, J. R. (1992). A cybernetic theory of stress, coping and well-being in 
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 17, 238-274. 
Epley, S. W. (1974). Reduction of the behavioral effects of aversive stimulation by the 
presence of companions. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 271-283. 
Evans, G. W., & Cohen, S. (1987). Environmental Stress. In D. Stokols & I. Altman 
(Eds.), Handbook of Environmental Psychology (p. 571–610). New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Fetsch, R., & Schultz, C. (2004). Anger, conflict and violence levels: A comparison of 
farm ranch with city urban residents. Journal of Adolescent Research, 19(5), 
533-559. 
Fox, E. M., & Urwick, L. (Eds.). (1982). Dynamic administration: The collected papers 
of Mary Parker Follett. (2nd ed.). New York: Hippocrene Books. 
Fried, Y., Rowland, K. M., & Ferris, G. R. (1984). The physiological measurement of 
work stress: A critique. Personnel Psychology, 37, 583-616. 
 
 113 
Fusilier, M. R., Ganster, D. C., & Mayes, B. T. (1987). Effects of social support, role 
stress and locus of control on health. Journal of Management, 13(3), 517-528. 
Ganster, D. C., Fusilier, M. R., & Mayes, B. T. (1986, February). Role of social support 
in the experience of stress at work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71(1), 
102-110. 
Ganster, D. C., & Victor, B. (Eds.). (1988, March). Stress and health [Special issue]. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 61(1Mar 1988). 
Gavin, M. B., & Hofmann, S. A. (2002). Using hierarchical linear modeling to 
investigate the moderating influence of leadership climate. The Leadership 
Quarterly, 13, 15-33. 
Glenn, D., Beckham, J., Feldman, M., Kirby, A., Hertzberg, M., & Moore, S. (2002, 
August). Violence and hostility among families of Vietnam veterans with combat 
related post-traumatic stress disorder. Violence and Victims, 17(4), 473-489. 
Googins, B., & Godfrey, J. (1985). The evolution of occupational social work. Social 
Work, 30, 496-402. 
Gottlieb, B. H. (1983, March). Social support as a focus for integrative research in 
psychology. American Psychologist, 278-287. 
Greenberg, L., & Barling, J. (1998). Predicting employee aggression against coworkers, 
subordinates and supervisors: The roles of person behaviors and perceived 
workplace factors. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 897-913. 
Grinker, H. (1953). Psychosomatic concepts. New York: Norton. 
Grinker, H., & Spiegel, J. (1949). Men under stress. New York: Irvington. 
 
 114 
Gupta, N., & Beehr, T. (1979). Job stress and employee behaviors. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 23, 373-387. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). Multivariate Data 
Analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Original work 
published 1984) 
Haley, S. A. (1975). When the patient reports atrocities. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
30, 191-196. 
Harris, J. (1999). The history of Army social work. In J. G. Daley (Ed.), Social Work 
Practice in the Military (pp. 3-22). Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. 
Hatfield, E., & Rapson, R. L. (1987, Spring). Gender differences in love and intimacy. 
Journal of Social Work & Human Sexuality, 5 (2), 15-26. 
Henderson, S., Byrne, P. G., & Duncan-Jones, P. (1981). Neurosis and the social 
environment. North Rhyde, Australia: Academic. 
Hendin, H., & Haas-Pollinger, A. (1984). Wounds of war - The psychological aftermath 
of combat in Vietnam. New York: Basic Books. 
Hobfall, S. E. (1986). Social support: Research, theory and applications from research on 
women. In S. E. Hobfoll (Ed.), Stress, Social Support, and Women. (pp. 239-256). 
Washington, DC: Hemisphere Publishing Corp. 
Hobfoll, S. C., Spielberger, C. D., Breznitz, S., Figley, C., Folkman, S., Lepper-Green, B. 
(1991, August). War related stress. Addressing the stress of war and other 
traumatic events. American Psychologist, 46(8), 848-855. 
Hobfoll, S. E., & Freedy, J. R. (1990, Spring). The availability and effective use of social 
support. Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 9(1), 91-103. 
 
 115 
Hobfoll, S. E., & Walfisch, S. (1984, February). Coping with a threat to life: A 
longitudinal study of self concept, social support, and psychological distress. 
American Journal of Community Psychology, 12(1), 87-100. 
Hoge, C. W., Castro, C. A., Messer, S. C., McGurk, D., Cotting, D. I., & Koffman, R. L. 
(2004, July). Combat duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, mental health problems and 
barriers to care. The New England Journal of Medicine, 351(1), 13-22. 
House, R. J. (1981). Work Stress and Social Support. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Indik, B. P. (1968). Toward and effective theory of organizational behavior. Personnel 
Administration, 31. (4), 51-57. 
Jackson, S. E., & Schuler, R. S. (1985). A meta-analysis and conceptual critique of 
research on role ambiguity and role conflict in work settings. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 36, 16-78. 
Jamal, M. (1984). Job stress and job performance controversy: An empirical assessment. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 33, 1-21. 
Jex, S. M., Beehr, T. A., & Roberts, C. K. (1992). The meaning of occupational stress 
items to survey respondents. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77(5), 623-628. 
Jex, S. M., & Thomas, J. L. (2003, April). Relations between stressors and group 
perceptions: Main and mediating effects. Work & Stress, 17 (2), 158-169. 
Kahn, R. L., & Byosiere, M. (1992). Stress in organizations. In M. Dunnette (Ed.), 
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (pp. 571-650). Palo Alto, 
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
 
 116 
Kaniasty, K., & Norris, F. H. (1992). Social support and victims of crime: Matching 
event, support and outcome. American Journal of Community Psychology, 20(2), 
211-241. 
Karasek, R., & Theorell, T. (1990). Healthy Work. New York: Basic Books. 
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The Social Psychology of Organizations (2nd ed.). New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Keane, T. M., Caddell, J. M., & Taylor, K. L. (1988). Mississippi scale for 
combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder: Three studies in reliability and 
validity. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56(1), 85-90. 
Keane, T. M., Fairbank, J. A., Caddell, J. M., Zimmering, R. T., Taylor, K. L., & Mora, 
C. A. (1989). Clinical evaluation of a measure to assess combat exposure. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1(1), 53-55. 
Keane, T. M., Scott, W. O., Chavoya, G. A., Lamparksi, D. M., & Fairbank, J. A. (1985). 
Social support in Vietnam veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder: A 
comparative analysis. Journal of Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 53, 95-102. 
Kessler, R. C., & McLeod, J. D. (1985). Social support and mental health in community 
samples. In S. Cohen & L. S. Syme (Eds.), Social Support and Health. (pp. 
219-240). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc. 
King, L. A., King, D. W., Fairbanks, J., Keane, T. M., & Adams, G. A. (1998). 
Resilience recovery factors in post-traumatic stress disorder among female and 
male Vietnam veteran’s hardiness, postwar social support and additional stressful 
life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 420-434. 
 
 117 
Klein, K. J., Hall, R. J., & Dansereau, F. (1994). Levels issues in theory development, 
data collection, and analysis. Academy of Management Review, 19, 195-229. 
Kobasa, S. C., & Puccetti, M. C. (1983, October). Personality and social resources in 
stress resistance. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 45(4), 839-850. 
Kutash, I. L. (1978). Treating the victim of aggression. In I. L. Kutash & S. L. 
Schlesinger (Eds.), Violence: Perspectives on Murder and Aggression (pp. 
446-461). San Francisco: CA: Josey-Bass. 
LaRocco, J. M., House, J. S., & French, J. R. (1980, September). Social support, 
occupational stress and health. Journal of Health & Social Behavior, 21(2), 
202-218. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1995). Psychological stress in the workplace. In R. Crandall & P. L. 
Perrewé (Eds.), Occupational stress: A handbook. (pp. 3-14). Washington, DC: 
Taylor and Francis. 
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, Appraisal and Coping. New York: 
Springer. 
Lazarus, R. S., & Launier, R. (1978). Stress related transactions between person and 
environment. In L. A. Pervin & M. Lewis (Eds.), Perspectives in International 
Psychology (pp. 287-327). New York: Plenum. 
Leather, P., Lawrence, C., & Beale, D. (1998, April/May). Exposure to occupational 




Lewis, S. J. (2002). A Multi-level, Longitudinal Study of Strain Reducing Effects of 
Group Efficacy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Florida State University, 
Tallahassee, FL. 
Lockett, D. (1999). The Future of Army Social Work . In J. G. Daley (Ed.), Social Work 
Practice in the Military (pp. 307-316). Binghamton, NY: The Harwork Press. 
Manning, F. J. (1991). Morale, cohesion and esprit de corps. In G. Ruven & D. A. 
Mangelsdorff (Eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology (pp. 453-470). Oxford, 
England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Martin, J. A., & Campbell, S. J. (1999). The role of the social work officer in support of 
combat and non-combat operations. In J. G. Daley (Ed.), Social Work Practice in 
the Military (pp. 137-164). Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. 
Moos, R. H. (1973, August). Conceptualizations of human environments. American 
Psychologist, 28(8), 652-665. 
Newton, R., Donaldson-Connelly, C., & Landsverk, J. (2001). An examination of 
measurement characteristics and factorial validity of the revised conflict tactics 
scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 61(2), 317-335. 
Nock, M., Kaufman, J., & Rosenheck, R. A. (2001). Examination of predictors of severe 
violence in combat-exposed Vietnam veterans. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 
14(4), 835-841. 
Noy, S. (1991). Combat stress reactions. In R. Gal & D. Mangelsdorf (Eds.), Handbook 
of Military Psychology (pp. 507-530). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Pearlin, L. I., Menaghan, E. G., & Lieberman, M. A. (1981, December). The stress 
process. Journal of Health & Social Behavior, 22(4), 337-356. 
 
 119 
Perrew’e, P. L., & Zellars, K. L. (1999). An examination of attributions and emotions in 
the transactional approach to the organizational stress process. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 20, 739-752. 
Prigerson, H. G., Maciejewski, P. K., & Rosenheck, R. A. (2002). Population attributable 
fractions of psychiatric disorders and behavioral outcomes associated with combat 
exposures among US men. American Journal of Public Health, 92, 59-63. 
Rosen, L. N., & Moghadam, L. Z. (1988, Summer). Social support, family separation and 
well-being among military wives. Behavioral Medicine, 14(2), 64-70. 
Schat, A., & Kelloway, K. (2003). Reducing the adverse consequences of workplace 
aggression and violence: The buffering effects of organizational support. Journal 
of Occupational Health Psychology, 8(2), 110-122. 
Schnall, P. L., Landsbergis, P. A., & Baker, D. (1994). Job strain and cardiovascular 
disease. Annual Review of Public Health, 15, 381-411. 
Schneider, B. (1983). Interactional psychology and organizational behavior. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 5, 1-31. 
Schulz, R., Greenley, J., & Brown, R. (1995). Organization, management and client 
effect on staff burnout. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 36, 333-345. 
Selye, H. (1956). The Stress of Life. NY: McGraw Hill. 
Shamir, B., Zakay, B. E., & Breinin, E. (1998, August). Correlates of charismatic leader 
behavior in military units: Subordinate’s attitudes, unit characteristics and 




Silver, R. L., & Wortman, C. B. (2001). Coping with undesirable life events. In J. Garber 
& M. E. Seligman (Eds.), Human Helplessness: Theory and Applications (pp. 
279-340). New York: Academic Press. 
Simpson, J. A., Rholes, W. S., & Oriña, M. M. (2002, May). Working models of 
attachment, support giving, and support seeking in a stressful situation. 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 28 (5), 598-608. 
Solomon, Z. (1985). Stress, social support, and affective disorders in mothers of 
pre-school children: A test of the stress buffering effect of social support. Social 
Psychiatry, 20(2), 100-105. 
Solomon, Z., & Mikulincer, M. (1990). Life events and combat related post traumatic 
stress disorder: The intervening roles of locus of control and social support. 
Military Psychology, 2(4), 241-256. 
Solomon, Z., Mikulincer, M., & Hobfoll, S. E. (1986, December). Effects of social 
support and battle intensity on loneliness and break down during combat. Journal 
of Personality & Social Psychology, Vol 51(6), 1269-1276. 
Sorge, A., & Warner, M. (Eds.). (1997). The IEBM Handbook of Organizational 
Behavior. London: International Thomson Business Press. 
Springer, D. W., Abell, N., & Nugent, W.  (2002).  Creating and validating rapid 
assessment instruments for practice and research: Part 2.   Research on Social 
Work Practice, 12(6), 768-795. 
Strauss, M. A. (1979). Measuring intrafamily conflict and violence: The conflict tactics 
scale. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 36, 75-88. 
Sullivan, S. E., & Bhagat, R. S. (1992). Where do we go from here. Journal of 
Management, 18, 353-374. 
 
 121 
Tate, R. L. (1998).  An introduction to modeling outcomes in the behavioral and social               
sciences (2nd ed.).  Edina, MN: Burgess International Group, Inc. 
Tetrick, L. E., & LaRocco, J. M. (1987, November). Understanding, prediction, and 
control as moderators of the relationships between perceived stress satisfaction 
and psychological well being. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72(4), 538-543. 
Thoits, P. A. (1986). Social support as coping assistance. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 54(4), 416-423. 
Uchino, B., Cacioppo, J., & Kiecolt-Glasser, J. (1996). The relationship between social 
support and physiological process: A review with emphasis on underlying 
mechanisms and implications for health. Psychological Bulletin, 119(3), 488-531. 
U.S. Army Surgeon General (Ed.). (2002, October). Fort Bragg Epidemiological 
Consultation Report. 
Viswesvaran, C., Sanchez, J. I., & Fisher, J. (1999, April). The role of social support in 
the work stress process: A meta-analysis. Journal of Vocational Behavior , 54(2), 
314-334. 
Wethington, E., & Kessler, R. C. (1986, March). Perceived support, received support and 
adjustment to stressful life events. Journal of Health & Social Behavior, 27(1), 
78-89. 
Winnubst, J. M., & Schabracq, M. J. (1996). Social support, stress and organization: 
Towards optimal matching. In M. J. Schabracq, J. M. Winnubst, & C. L. Cooper 




Wykes, T., & Whittington, R. (1998, December). Prevalence and predictors of early 
traumatic stress in assaulted psychiatric nurses. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 
9(3), 643-658. 
Zapf, D., Dormann, C., & Frese, M. (1996, April). Longitudinal studies in organizational 
stress research: A review of the literature with reference to methodological issues. 






















Graeme Charles Bicknell was born in Rochford, Essex County, England on 22 
August, 1963, the son of Jean Bicknell and John Charles Bicknell. After completing his 
work at Northville High School, Northville, Michigan in 1981, he entered the Army. 
After honorably finishing his enlistment in 1989, he entered and graduated with a 
Bachelor of Science from Metropolitan State College of Denver in 1992. In 1994 he 
received the degree of Masters of Social Work from the University of Denver. He then 
returned to the Army as a Commissioned Officer to perform duties as a Social Work 
Officer. In 2001 he was selected by the Army for the Long Term Health and Educational 
Training. After a six month combat deployment to Afghanistan, he entered the Graduate 
School of Social Work at The University of Texas at Austin. 
 
 
Permanent Address: 234 Larchmont, San Antonio, Texas  78209 
 
 
